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INTRODUCTION
In Fighting Words, Professor Richard L. Abel addresses the
problem of group-subordinating speech-speech spoken with the
purpose or effect of maintaining one group's domination over another
group. Such speech presumably includes face-to-face racial insults,
sexually demeaning comments to female employees, and group
defamation as paradigm cases.2 For ease of reference, Professor Abel
labels such actions "harmful speech.",3
Professor Abel argues, however, that the law is often a clumsy,
ineffective, and sometimes even destructive way of addressing speech-
based harms.4 Yet, he is unwilling to tolerate those harms, which cry
out for resolution. He recommends, therefore, that "civil society"-
institutions of everyday life, such as corporations and universities-
take a clear stand against harmful speech, and redress the wrongs that
nevertheless occur.5
* Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law; Visiting Professor, Duke
University School of Law, 2000-2001; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1981; former
Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, PA. The author thanks his wife, Patricia V. Sun,
Esq., and Professors Margaret L. Paris, Robert Mosteller, Girardeau Spann, and Alan Calnan
for their comments on earlier drafts of this article, and his research assistants, Nicole
Crawford, Eli Mazur, Amy Pope, Nia Ayanna, Semira Asfasha, and Baarez Nebbiat. My
thanks as well to MARGINS: MARYLAND'S INTERDISCIPLINARY PUBLICATION ON RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER AND CLASS for its invitation to speak at this symposium and to Professor
Richard L. Abel for creating the opportunity for these musings by authoring his thought-
provoking paper.
1. Richard L. Abel, Fighting Words, 1 MARGINS 199 (2001) [hereinafter Fighting
Words]. The term "group-subordinating speech" is mine, but I think it aptly characterizes the
subject matter of Professor Abel's paper.
2. See id. at 201-02. Many of the stories that Professor Abel tells can be fit into
variations on these paradigm cases, and they are, in any event, the core sorts of cases on which
scholars in this area tend to focus their ire. See infra Part 1B.
3. See id. at 218. His broader thesis that cultural language wars are about respect for
social groups is fully developed at RICHARD L. ABEL, SPEAKING RESPECT, RESPECTING SPEECH
(1998) [hereinafter SPEAKING RESPECT].
4. See Abel, supra note 1, at 215-18.
5. See id. at 218. Professor Abel also worries that legal prohibitions may unduly
silence legitimate dissent. See id. at 303. On the importance of encouraging expression of
dissent as a First Amendment free speech value, see STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE,
AND THE MEANING OF AMERICA (1999); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990). On the value of dissent to constitutional and legal
discourse more generally, see STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A
MEDITATION ON LAW, RELIGION, AND LOYALTY (1998); LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, STACKED
DECK: A STORY OF SELFISHNESS IN AMERICA (1998).
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For example, Abel's approach suggests that an employer
should ostracize an employee who engages in racial insults on the job.
Similarly, his approach suggests that teachers should lecture their
students about the evils of sexual harassment. But legal prohibition of
either the insults or the harassment is either unwise or inadequate
alone.
6
Abel's conclusions stem from his belief that when social
groups clash over controversial issues, such as race, wealth, politics,
and sexual orientation, their conflict is ultimately about "respect,"
which he defines as one group demanding to be recognized as of
valuable status by another group. 7 The law, he suggests, is often not
well equipped to promote inter-group respect. The legal system's
weaknesses, declares Professor Abel, include its failure to recognize
that words can be ambiguous, its misreading or disregard of speakers'
intentions (which may not be malicious), its tendency to treat speech
as entirely good or entirely bad, its reading of words outside of social
context, and its reliance on unproven assumptions that certain forms of
harmful speech cause particular types of harms. 8  Moreover, he
contends that the law may unduly silence legitimate dissenting speech
or provoke a backlash against political correctness.
9
But the usual alternative option of leaving harmful speech
completely unregulated, says Professor Abel, is equally foolish. The
anti-regulation position, he suggests, reflects Americans' tendency to
"fetishize" the First Amendment. 10 Such fetishization, he explains,
ignores the reality that government must and does regulate much
speech-the freedom to speak is never absolute." Furthermore,
speech unregulated by the state is instead regulated by market forces.
"Those who pay to disseminate a message, whether advertisers or
6. See Abel, supra note 1, at 215-18. These examples follow from Professor Abel's
arguments, though he does not use these precise examples himself.
7. Id. at 200, 304-5.
8. See id. at 214-18, 254-56.
9. See id. at 212, 218. On the ways in which market forces and wealth inequalities can
also silence dissent, see RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF
DISCOURSE (1996); SUE CURRY JANSEN, CENSORSHIP: THE KNOT THAT BINDS POWER AND
KNOWLEDGE (1991).
10. See Abel, supra note 1, at 215.
11. See id.
2001] 307
MARGINS
audience, significantly influence its content." 12  Complete non-
regulation is thus an illusion.
Furthermore, Abel states that group-subordinating speech
generates very real harms by reproducing status inequalities. Such
speech promotes inequality both "intensively," through face-to-face
insults and humiliations, and "extensively," through texts, advertising,
journalism, popular culture, and public symbols. 13  Liberals, who
oppose regulation and insist upon a "false neutrality"' 4-believing that
neither one side's speech nor the other's should be favored by social
institutions-thus become complicit in injustice. Society must openly
side with the oppressed.15 Regulation of some sort is essential.
If neither the law nor the market offer adequate regulation,
what does? As previously noted, Professor Abel's answer is "civil
society"--the schools, universities, workplaces, trade unions, shops,
cultural venues, mass media, mass transportation, and voluntary
associations of everyday experience.' 6  These entities are better
equipped to engage in conversations that foster understanding and
respect. Thus, these institutions can allow offenders to explain that
their motives were good; they never meant to hurt or offend. If the
victim accepts this explanation, the matter is at an end, the harms
largely dissipated.' 7  If the victim rejects these explanations, an
apology by the offender to his victim must be made.' 8 Professor Abel
recognizes that apologies do not always suffice-for example, where
apologies are insincere or coerced, where the offender indeed intended
to insult the victim, or where the offender is responsible for a long
history of victim status degradation. 19 Nevertheless, Professor Abel
believes that the apology is often a powerful tool even when it is
12. See id. See generally R. GEORGE WRIGHT, SELLING WORDS: FREE SPEECH IN A
COMMERCIAL CULTURE (1997) (discussing how commercialization shapes speech and
American culture).
13. See Abel, supra note 1 at 216.
14. Id. at 216, 285-86.
15. See id. at 303-04.
16. Seeid. at218.
17. See id. at 254-55.
18. See id. On the role of apology more generally in resolving group conflict, see
MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 93, 107, 112-16, 117 (1998); ERIC YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL
JUSTICE: CONFLICT & RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 50-60, 210-36 (1999).
19. See Abel, supra note 1 at 254-55, 304.
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rejected, because rejecting an inadequate apology "preserves the
victim's moral superiority.
'
"
20
I applaud Professor Abel's exploration of the idea that civil
society can be an important mechanism for redressing the risks and
harms of group-subordinating speech. Indeed, I agree with his
entreaty to give civil society its due. But I worry that his sole
emphasis on civil society will lead readers of his article to ignore
important advantages that the law may sometimes have over civil
society. In particular, harmful speech may justly inspire retributive
anger in its victims-anger that merits a retributive response. 2 1 The
law is generally (if not always) a far better instrument than civil
society for wreaking retribution. Retributive anger stems from the
sense that an oppressor has treated his victim as inferior.23  Society
most effectively expresses its rejection of that message via state-
inflicted punishment, for reasons that this article will explore.
24
Moreover, respect is about more than- status; respect is also about
fostering a sense of group and individual inclusion in a broader
political community.25  Law, I argue, has a special role to play in
promoting equal political belonging by imposing expressive
retribution upon oppressors. 26 Although civil society may often help
in achieving other sorts of goals often served by the law-for example,
offender rehabilitation or deterrence of other would-be offenders-
20. Id. at 274. Professor Abel's proposal, by emphasizing addressing group emotional
needs and using tools like the apology to further reconciliation, has some commonalities with
Eric Yamamoto's "racial praxis." See YAMAMOTO, supra note 18 (emphasizing reconciliation
among racial minorities, rather than between minorities and the majority).
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part I Al.
23. See generally, Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the
Critics of Hate Crimes Legislation Are Wrong, B. C. L. REV. 739, 746-58 (1999) [hereinafter
Racist Personality; Andrew E. Taslitz, Two Concepts of the Emotions in Date Rape, 15 WIS.
WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 48-64 (2000) [hereinafter Two Concepts].
24. See infra text accompanying notes 39-140.
25. See infra text Part I C.
26. See infra text Part I C; see generally, Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson,
Still Officers of the Court: Why the First Amendment Is No Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism
and Ethnic Bias in the Legal Profession, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 781 (1996) (recommending
certain restrictions on lawyers' speech uttered in the course of representing clients as a way of
furthering equality values) [hereinafter Still Officers of the Court]; ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE
AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 137-45 (1999) [hereinafter RAPE AND CULTURE]
(arguing equality and free speech values are sometimes complementary).
2001]
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only the law adequately addresses societal needs for retribution and
political inclusion.
Professor Abel also recognizes that his turn to civil society
requires the subordinated to avoid "victim passivity. ' ' 28 Victims must
step forward to demand redress. That will not happen, he concedes,
unless victims' consciousness is transformed so that they see the harms
that they suffer as "contingent rather than inevitable," 29 that is, as
subject to change by victim complaint and agitation. Furthermore, the
collectivities of civil society must provide moral and political support
for victims while protecting them from offender retaliation.
30
Here, too, I think that Professor Abel is unduly optimistic.
Civil society's institutions will often lack either the self-awareness or
the will to protect victims from subordinating speech. The fear of
legal liability can offer incentives for action in civil society that would
otherwise not exist.
3 1
In identifying some virtues of legal regulation generally, and of
retributive state action specifically, I do not mean either to belittle the
benefits of harm-redressing efforts in civil society or to exaggerate the
benefits of retribution. As this article will soon explain, there are
important limitations on when retribution should play any role in the
law. Furthermore, contrary to the conventional wisdom, retribution
does not necessarily require criminal punishment. Indeed, I will argue
that society should be wary of too quickly turning to the criminal
justice system. Instead, the civil justice system can also play an
important, and indeed often primary, retributive role-a point partially
and somewhat tentatively recently acknowledged by the United States
Supreme Court.32 Sexual harassment civil suits can, for example, be
27. See infra Part I.
28. See Abel, supra note 1 at 217.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. See infra Part I E.
32. See Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001)
(holding a punitive damages award in a civil suit should be reviewed under a de novo standard
because, having a punitive purpose, the award raises constitutional questions under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution's prohibition against excessive fines and cruel
and unusual punishments, as well as under the Due Process Clause). The Court majority
elaborated:
Although compensatory damages and punitive damages are typically
awarded at the same time by the same decisionmaker, they serve distinct
purposes. The former are intended to redress the concrete loss that the
310 [VOL. 1:305
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understood as serving important retributive functions in responding to
some forms of group-subordinating speech.33
As to my former point-that civil society does indeed have
important benefits as a mechanism for regulating harmful speech-I
plaintiff has suffered by reason of defendant's wrongful conduct.... The
latter, which have been described as "quasi-criminal," ... operate as
"private fines" intended to punish the defendant and to deter future
wrongdoing. A jury's assessment of the extent of a plaintiff's injury is
essentially a factual determination, whereas its imposition of punitive
damages is an expression of its moral condemnation. See ... Haslip, 499
U.S., at 54, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Punitive damages
are specifically designed to exact punishment in excess of actual harm to
make clear that the defendant's misconduct was especially
reprehensible.")
The Court majority also favorably cited Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, Assessing Punitive
Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2074 (1998)
("Punitive damages may have a retributive or expressive function, designed to embody social
outrage at the action of serious wrongdoers.")
While acknowledging a role for retribution in tort law, the Court majority seems to
limit that role to punitive damages. Yet some forms of compensatory damages may implicitly
serve retributive functions. Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent in Cooper Industries, Inc., laid the
groundwork for this sort of argument. Thus she explained that punitive damages are similar in
nature to "compensatory" damages for intangible, non-economic injury:
One million dollars' worth of pain and suffering does not exist as a "fact"
in the world any more or less than one million dollars' worth of moral
outrage. Both derive their meaning from a set of underlying facts as
determined by a jury. If one exercise in quantification is properly
regarded as fact finding, ... it seems to me the other should be so regarded
as well.
Id. at 1691 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Both sorts of damages, Justice Ginsburg further
explained, involve "more than the resolution of matters of historical or predictive fact." Id.
Although Justice Ginsburg addressed these similarities to argue that both sorts of damages
should be governed by a similar standard of review, her logic has other implications. If both
intangible compensatory and punitive damages involve the jury's determination of the
"meaning" arising from an underlying set of facts, then both surely involve the jury's moral
judgment. The Court majority concedes that this is the case for punitive damages and that
they turn on a retributive morality, yet the words "pain and suffering" seem invited in part to
appeal to retributive emotions. Similarly, torts seeking recovery for "dignitary harms," as
speech-based-injury lawsuits seem to be, see infra text accompanying notes 100-140, 236-93,
involve intangible damages that invite a retributive analysis.
Both the Court majority and Justice Ginsburg also ignored the retributive aspects of
the very process of tort litigation. The excessive cost, nastiness, hyper-adversarialism, and
generally extreme unpleasantness of the American approach to tort lawsuits is often best
understood as serving retributive functions. See Robert C. Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance: On
Law and the Satisfaction of Emotion, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 123, 134-36 (Susan Bandes
ed., 1999).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 244-63.
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note several benefits either ignored or minimized by Professor Abel.
Notably, sometimes that mechanism is the only one that the law
allows.3 Furthermore, the act of victim protest in civil society has a
special dignity and power that aids human flourishing and the quality
of public discourse.35  Additionally, civil society's continued
engagement in an egalitarian struggle may dramatically improve the
likelihood that laws regulating harmful speech will have positive
effects. 36 Law and civil society thus serve complementary functions,
each helping the other in doing its job more effectively.
Part I explores the special advantages of legal regulation of
harmful speech, particularly in redressing legitimate retributive anger.
Part I also explains, however, why these advantages are best achieved
through the civil, rather than the criminal, justice system. Part I also
examines the ways in which law can improve the regulatory
performance of the institutions of civil society.
Part II considers the advantages to the turn to civil society that
were not fully developed or even noted at all by Professor Abel. Part
II further analyzes the ways in which civil society improves the
regulatory functioning of law.
A few final caveats. I make no claim to have definitively
defended any of the points that I make here. Nor am I recommending
any specific sort of regulation for any category of harmful speech.
Almost no one is a free speech absolutist.37 The question for most
people is, after weighing the costs and benefits of regulation in a
particular area, what speech should be regulated and in what fashion?
38
This question is highly contextual and cannot even be attempted for
any one area of potential regulation, much less for many areas, in so
general an article. Furthermore, I am addressing the policy wisdom of
legal regulation, not its constitutionality, though I necessarily must
touch on questions of constitutionality as part of any sound system of
practical judgment. My modest goal, therefore, is simply to add a
number of concerns to the balancing mix. Professor Abel has started a
34. See infra Part IIA.
35. See infra Part 1iB.
36. See infra Part 1IC; see generally THOMAS DAVID JONES, HUMAN RIGHTS: GROUP
DEFAMATION, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 61-76 (1998).
37. See infra Part 1B3; see infra Part IC; JONES, supra note 36, at 61-76; RODNEY
SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 23-27, 43-54 (1992).
38. See Abel, supra note 1, at 215-16.
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new conversation, one that examines not merely whether and how to
regulate harmful speech, but what institutions should do so. I want to
include in that conversation the recognition that sometimes multiple
social institutions must act. To focus on one sort of institution to the
exclusion of others is to miss an important part of the picture. But I
seek merely to join the new conversation and to stir others to do so
too. I make no pretense of having the final word.
I. THE ADVANTAGES OF LEGAL REGULATION OF HARMFUL
SPEECH
A. The More-Than-Occasional Necessity of Retribution as a Response
. to Harmful Speech
1. Retribution Versus Revenge
Among the major advantages of turning to civil society,
Professor Abel argues, are that the offender has a chance to disclaim ill
motives and, if that explanation is rejected by the victimized individual
or group, the offender has the further opportunity to apologize.39 But,
as Professor Abel notes, some insults are conscious, even deliberate.40
More commonly, the offender sees no offense in his speech or is
indifferent to its effects n.4 Relatedly, he explains, apologies may either
not be forthcoming or will be rejected because they appear coerced or
insincere or cannot begin to undo a harm, such as that stemming from
42a lengthy history of stereotyping.
I would add that apologies will often be rejected where they are
not accompanied by action. Thus, Professor Yamamoto has explained
that "a meaningful group apology is tied to a commitment to make
amends for past wrongs and to action on that commitment; 'confession
is a charade unless matched with action."' 43 And the chair of Japan's
39. See id. at 254-55.
40. See id. at 243-44. On the inability of some of the majority to see the offensive or
harmful nature of their speech to certain minorities, see id at 247.
41. See Abel, supra note 1.
42. See id. at 241-54.
43. YAMAMOTO, supra note 18, at 195 (quoting in part JOHN DAWSON, HEALING
AMERICA'S WOUNDS 48 (1995)).
2001]
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Social Democratic Party, in urging the government to compensate
Korean "comfort women," declared that "words of apology can carry
weight only if followed by deeds" because "apologies and
compensation are two sides of the same coin. 44
Now Professor Yamamoto suggests that the need for action and
compensation stems from an urge to repair damage done, a kind of
restorative or corrective justice.45  But I argue that demands for
compensation often have a retributive component-a desire to see the
offender suffer-a point I develop in section IB below. 46 Where an
apology is not even forthcoming at all or appears feigned, the
retributive need will be greater still, and this is especially true for the
sorts of group-subordinating harms of which Professor Abel speaks.47
Commentators often draw distinctions between "retribution"
and "revenge," but both stem from a similar emotional need: to see an
offender suffer as a way of restoring the victim's status in the eyes of
the community.48 When a wrongdoer treats a victim badly, he sends
the message that the victim is unworthy of better treatment. 49 When
the state fails to condemn the wrongdoer, the state embraces and
reaffirms that message.50  Through retribution, "the community
[instead] corrects the wrongdoer's false message that the victim was
44. Yvonne Park Hsu, "Comfort Women" From Korea: Japan's World War II Sex
Slaves and the Legitimacy of Their Claims For Reparations, 2 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 97, 128
(1992) (quoting Chairman Tanabe).
45. See YAMAMOTO, supra note 18, at 195-96 (describing apologies as doing
"reparatory work."). Yamamoto goes on to explain that "Reparatory work covers a range of
acts aimed at restoring those harmed financially and psychically and repairing damaged social
relationships-by the payment of money, the return of lands, the opening or restructuring of
institutions, and the like." Id. at 196. See also ALAN CALNAN, JUSTICE AND TORT LAW 99-104
(1997) (defining "corrective justice" and explaining its role in tort law); Gordon Bazemore,
Communities, Victims and Offender Reintegration.: Restorative Justice and Earned
Redemption in Civic REPENTANCE (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1999) (explaining the concept of
restorative criminal justice).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 202-32.
47. See YAMAMOTO, supra note 18, at 194-98 (suggesting that when apology and
martyrdom fail, revenge is the only remaining option).
48. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23 (arguing retributive need arising from
group-subordinating harms stems from the messages expressed in hate crimes).
49. See Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN
LAW 38-39 (Joseph Sandars & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2000).
50. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 749-53. See also Mari Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, in WORDS THAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 25 (Mari Matsuda
et al. eds., 1993).
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less worthy or valuable than the wrongdoer; through retribution, the
community reasserts the truth of the victim's value by inflicting a
publicly visible defeat on the wrongdoer." 51  Retribution need not
always be the function of the criminal justice system. Tort
compensations schemes can serve retributive purposes. 2 Indeed,
litigants whom I have known personally and who are involved in civil
rights suits have sometimes expressed the desire to "make them pay,"
or "even the score," the "them" referring to the offending group or
institution.
That vengeance and retribution both stem from the emotional
desire to reject the offender's evil message that he is superior to his
victim does not mean, however, that there is no distinction between the
two concepts. Legal philosophers sharply disagree about whether this
difference is real, and, if so, how to define it.53  Most commonly,
retribution is viewed as involving proportionality, cool detachment,
and the consistency of fair legal processes while vengeance is "the
voice of the other, the primitive, the savage call of unreason,
'wildness' inside the house of law, which, by nature, will not succumb
to rational forms of justice." 54 Vengeance should have no role in the
law, it is argued, because vengeance knows no limits.55
This sort of argument overstates the differences between the
two concepts. Vengeance is not a mere unthinking lashing out.
56
Rather, it is typically "cool," often involving careful planning, a
substantial investment of time and energy, and even an effort to hold
its object in long-term and fearful suspense. 7 These ideas are
commonly expressed in the aphorism, "revenge is a dish that is best
51. MINOW, supra note 18, at 12.
52. See infra section 1B.
53. See, e.g., AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN TRADITION 38-43 (2001) (reviewing some scholarly efforts along these lines); IGOR
PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 70-71 (1989) (articulating traditional
revenge/retribution distinction); CHARLES K.B. BARTON, GETrING EVEN: REVENGE AS A FORM
OF JUSTICE 52-69 (1999) (noting revenge is a specialized form of retribution); Solomon, supra
note 32, at 127-37 (distinguishing between revenge and retribution); Vidmar, supra note 49, at
37-38 (retribution and revenge have similar underlying psychological dynamics).
54. SARAT, supra note 53, at 39.
55. See id.
56. See Solomon, supra note 32, at 133.
57. See id. at 130.
20011
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served cold."58  The desire for vengeance can still be intense,
intractable, and single-minded, but it is neither wild nor unreflective.59
Moreover, the traditional revenge/retribution distinction
disregards the reality that "we all recognize the difference between
justified and unjustified revenge. Vengeance is not just the desire to
harm, but the desire to punish for good reason and to the right
measure." 60  Similarly, retribution in its everyday meaning of
intentionally-inflicted suffering on another may be visited upon an
offender in the form of a dispassionate legal process, yet be
disproportionate-even cruel.61  What adherents of the traditional
distinction describe as "retribution" is really a description of what the
common layperson would understand as justified revenge.
Furthermore, even many of the traditionalists concede that
retribution unavoidably involves a hidden element of vengeance below
the surface.62  Indeed, a legal system that entirely ignores victims'
emotions may lead to private acts of violence, decreased respect for
the law, and a loss of social cohesion.63  The real problem is the
relative mix of vengeance and retribution in a society and how to
permit their expression. But this problem again presupposes that the
distinction between the two ideas is real-a position I have thus far
disparaged.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 142.
61. Id.
62. See SARAT, supra note 53, at 38-43.
63. See, e.g., Vidmar, supra note 49, at 43, 47-49, 56 (presenting empirical data that
demonstrates retribution reaffirms social norms and at least suggests, although more research
is needed, that failure to satisfy retributive anger promotes aggression toward others); accord
Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 835-45 (2000) (proposing retributive punishment
promotes social solidarity); Solomon, supra note 32, at 131 ("[S]uppressing the thirst for
revenge may well have devious manifestations that are much worse than its satisfaction").
The United States Supreme Court has expressed a similar sentiment:
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling
that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important
purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law. When
people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to
impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they "deserve," then there
are sown the seeds of anarchy-self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 237-38 (1976); But see infra text accompanying notes 177-
366 (cataloguing some of the arguments that the death penalty is in fact inconsistent with
retributive theory).
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Yet the distinction is both real and significant in one important
way: revenge involves a personal quality, the relevant emotions arising
in the victim or those close to him; retribution involves the emotional
needs of society as a whole. 64 The emotion of "resentment" describes
what the victim feels, and "indignation" describes what society feels.65
Society as a whole can punish, of course, only through the institutions
of the state. Individuals, however, can express their will through
individual decision and action. The fear of the critics of vengeance is
best understood as a concern that individuals are not as well-equipped
as the state to determine and administerjustified punishment. Notably,
scholars fear that victims will become so consumed by resentment
toward, even hatred for, the offender that the victims lose sight of
proportionality or fair procedures.66  A different way of making an
analogous point is that what we truly fear "is the exercise of vengeance
by novices, or those with limited experience (or worse, experiences
informed by Hollywood and television) and little knowledge of the
consequences of taking revenge. The argument is not against
vengeance but in favor of experience, the deep experiences of a legal
tradition and the collective wisdom of society and history. 67
These concerns suggest that vengeance, like retribution, must
be domesticated by the law.6 8 Yet the law's involvement does not
necessarily change vengeance into something else. The personal
• • 69
nature of vengeance can be institutionalized. In such a system, the
personal views and experience of suffering of the victim are heard and
given great weight. The victim is also part of the process of
punishment. The process thereby fosters a sense that the victim, using
64. See BARTON, supra note 53, at 52-69 (stating the only real distinction between
"revenge" and "retribution" is that the former is more personal than the latter); cf CALNAN,
supra note 45, at 111-18 (distinguishing between the more personal "private," and the less
personal, "public" retributive justice).
65. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 749-50.
66. See, e.g., PRIMORATZ, supra note 53, at 71; Solomon, supra note 32, at 128.
67. Solomon, supra note 32, at 142
68. Id.
69. Cf MiNow, supra note 18, at 12 ("Retribution can be understood as vengeance
curbed by the intervention of someone other than the victim and by principles of
proportionality and individual rights"). Minow continues: "Finding some alternative to
vengeance-such as government-managed prosecutions-is a matter, then, not only of moral
and emotional significance. It is urgent for human survival." Id. at 14.
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the state as her agent, is herself inflicting the offender's suffering.70
That does not mean that the victim automatically prevails. The whole
point of the state's involvement is to determine whether vengeance is
justified, and to do so by fair procedures. But addressing the victim's
need for vengeance would be a significant (albeit not the only) reason
for inflicting punishment in such a regime.7'
Defenders of the Victims' Rights Movement, which seeks to
increase victim involvement in the criminal justice system, either
72implicitly or explicitly, adopt precisely this sort of reasoning. In
part, they dismiss fears of victim moral blindness and unthinking anger
as simply empirically incorrect. 73 I will argue in the pages that follow,
however, that these defenders have it exactly wrong. The civil justice
system is usually the appropriate vehicle for the expression of victims'
needs for vengeance.7 4 The civil system addresses moral wrongs to
persons, not to society as a whole.7 As such, the civil system is less
likely to be subject to broad-based social panics (e.g., the War on
Drugs, the War on Child Sexual Abuse) that can distort the fairness of
the relevant laws and procedures, 76 although no system of justice is
70. See BARTON, supra note 53, at 76-77.
71. See id. at 77, 82-83.
72. See id. at 77, 82-83, 101-10, 117-21.
73. See id. at 77, 82-83, 101-10, 117-213.
74. See id. at 125-27; infra Part I B.
75. Professor Barton, a staunch defender of victims' rights and the clearest proponent of
a philosophical justification for the movement, agrees that significant "privatization" of
retribution via the civil justice system makes conceptual sense. See BARTON, supra note 53, at
111. But he argues that this is too radical and impractical a change in the criminal justice
system in the short run. He misses the point, however, that the existing civil justice system
already serves retributive purposes and is readily available to address speech-evoked injuries,
or so I will argue infra Part 1B. Moreover, I favor retention of our separate system of public
prosecution for criminal cases but would be hesitant about too readily turning to that system
for problems that can better be addressed elsewhere. Finally, I do agree that victims need
better treatment by the criminal justice system and that their voices need to be heard and
considered. See TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 26 (extended consideration of
victims' role in rape cases). But there are costs to doing so, costs sometimes not worth paying.
See, e.g., SARAT, supra note 53, at 44-59 (arguing that the use of victim impact statements in
death penalty cases results in the "return of revenge," sentences determined more by private
grief and anger than offender culpability or public injury). Victim voices in criminal cases
should also be heard in ways that address the public injuries involved and do not detract from
the public nature of the proceedings. Furthermore, in all but the most serious cases, private
retributive needs are more likely to be met fairly and effectively in the civil justice system.
See infra Part lB.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 169-74.
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perfect. 77  The criminal justice system, by contrast, addresses
perceived injuries to society as a whole. 78 It is, therefore, the criminal
justice system that is more likely to be subject to widespread panic and
fear.79 Panic and fear may lead to precisely the disproportionate
"wild" sorts of punishments that traditionalists fear will stem from
revenge. 80 Furthermore, criminal penalties may simply be too extreme
as a response to many sorts of retributive injuries or wrongly be used
to attack what are perceived as primarily private moral injuries. I am
not suggesting that retribution should play no role in the criminal law.
For the most serious of offenses, the civil justice system's punishment
will be too lenient. 82 But criminal sanctions are justified by retribution
relatively rarely, and, given the high stakes and risks of error, should
be imposed with humility and regret.
83
77. See infra text accompanying notes 170-77 (discussing moral panics and their ill
effects in the criminal justice system).
78. See infra text accompanying notes 199-266.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 267-53.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 267-53.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 199-266; 304-333; Taslitz, Racist Personality,
supra note 23 (arguing for retributive criminal prosecution of violent hate crimes); Taslitz,
Two Concepts, supra note 23 (proposing the re-crafting of substantive rape law, guided by
retributive principles).
82. See infra text accompanying notes 208-20. The civil justice system, of course, is
also justified by the idea that individual harms and the rules governing them may have social
consequences. See ALAN CALNAN, JUSTICE AND TORT LAW 85-98, 127-29, 168-69, 181-82,
195-96, 199-202 (1997) (discussing distributive justice in tort law) But only criminal
prosecutions are meant to address public moral injuries. See id. at 111-16. Furthermore,
criminal prosecution involves more than raising insurance costs, or discouraging certain
activities, or other tangible injuries to large numbers of people. Only criminal prosecution
involves perceived injuries to "the people," the citizenry organized at the relevant level as an
organic, political whole.
83. See infra notes 196-198. See generally Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Epistemology, the
Retributive Emotions, and the "Clumsy Moral Philosophy" of Jesus Christ, in THE PASSIONS
OF THE LAW, supra note 32, at 149, 149-61. Jeffrie Murphy, long a staunch defender of
retributivism, worries that if we are too righteous and self-confident about retributive
punishment, we will make grave errors and do moral wrong ourselves. See id. at 160-61. But,
he writes:
Does this mean that we should abandon institutions of punishment in some
sentimental orgy of love and self-doubt? Of course not. What it does
mean is that, in punishing, we should act with caution, regret, humility,
and with a vivid realization that we are involved in a fallible and finite
human institution-one that is necessary but regrettable. The danger
arises we forget-as some of us who are retributivists sometimes, I fear,
do forget-that nothing but iniquity and madness awaits us if we let
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Because I want to emphasize the similar emotions involved in
"vengeance" and "retribution" but the different persons or groups who
experience those emotions, I will generally in the remainder of this
paper reject that traditional terminology. Instead, I will use the terms
personal retribution (for vengeance) and public retribution (for
retribution).84 I will return to traditional terminology only when
discussing other authors who use those terms.
An important remaining background question needs to be
answered first, however: If retribution is primarily about rejecting the
offender's message of his victim's inferiority, why is punishment the
way to do so? Why not instead issue a public proclamation that both
victim and offender are of equal value? Philosopher Jean Hampton,
the leading exponent of the communicative retributivism upon which I
rely here, examined this question by discussing a heinous case in
which a white farmer hung from a tree a black farmhand and his four
sons in burlap bags. The farmer next sliced off the farmhand's penis
and stuck it in his mouth, then burned all four victims to death.
85
Hampton, relying on the distinction between intended degradation (the
desire actually to reduce another person's value) and diminishment
(the message or appearance of reducing value),86 had this to say about
the incident:
Re-establishment of the acknowledgement of the
victim's worth is normally not accomplished by the
mere verbal or written assertion of the equality of worth
of wrongdoer and victim. For a judge or jury merely to
announce, after reviewing the facts of the farmer's
murder of the farmhand and his sons, that they were his
ourselves think that, in punishing, we are involved in some cosmic drama
of good and evil -that, like the Blues Brothers, we are on a mission from
God.... Let me then close appropriately with a final word from Nietsche:
"Whoever fights with monsters should take care that he does not become a
monster."
Id at 161 (quoting FRIEDRICH NIETSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, Epigram 146, 89 (transl.
Walter Kaufman 1989)).
84. See BARTON supra note 53, at 79-80 (distinguishing between "personal retributive
punishment" and the more public "judicial retribution"); infra text accompanying notes 199-
266 (similar distinction implied in the work of tort theorist Alan Calnan).
85. See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1659, 1675 (1992).
86. See id. at 1674.
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equal in value is to accomplish virtually nothing. The
farmer, by his actions, did not just "say" that these men
are worthless relative to him, but also sought to make
them into nothing by fashioning events that purported
to establish their extreme degradation. Even if we
believe that no such degradation actually took place, to
be strung up, castrated, and killed is to suffer severe
diminishment. This representation of degradation
requires more than just a few idle remarks to deny.87
Hampton's argument is fundamentally a psychological one: that most
members of society will not perceive a mere declaration of equality as
an adequate and sincere rejection of the offender's message of his
superiority to the victim. Instead, society must inflict on the offender
an injury comparable to what he inflicted on his victim.8 8 "The score
is even. Whatever mastery he can claim, she can also claim. If her
victimization is taken as evidence of her inferiority relative to the
wrongdoer, then his defeat at her hands negates the evidence."8 9
Accordingly, "the punishment is a second act of mastery that denies
the lordship asserted in the first act of mastery."
90
Importantly, Hampton is not saying that "mere words" never
merit a retributive response. To the contrary, elsewhere she expressly
makes the point that words, such as hate speech, can under certain
conditions be used to degrade other persons and can cause damage
sufficient to merit retributive punishment. 91 The points suggested by
her analysis of the farmer murderer example seem to be first, that an
offense consisting only of words does not merit criminal
punishment-a point with which I generally agree-but, second, that
the mere uttering of comforting words by the state in response to an
insulting offender action other than words is insufficient to negate the
offender's message of victim subordination. Indeed, Hampton
87. Id. at 1686-87.
88. See Hampton, supra note 85, at 1685; See also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY AND JEAN
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 128 (1988).
89. Hampton, supra note 85, at 1687.
90. See id at 1679-80.
91. Cf R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 107-09 2001
(2001) (arguing punishment may be necessary to show that the state "means what it says").
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suggests that such a minimal response would be insulting, a grievous
violation of the principle that the punishment must be proportional to
the harm.
92
At the same time, Hampton recognizes that "punishment," as
that term is commonly understood, is not the only possible retributive
response. An apology, followed by making amends, humbles us
before those whom we have disrespected, negating the message of
their inferior worth, at least where the injury is small and the apology
accepted.
93
Moreover, some innovative sex offender programs include a
requirement that the defendant participate in therapy sessions that
force him to experience some sense of the psychological pain that he
inflicted on his enemies-to teach him empathy.94 "By doing so, not
only does the state confirm the victim's importance, but it also defeats
the rapist's claim to mastery by putting him in a position where he
must, through his imagination, become her, and suffer as if he were
her." 95  This latter example, Hampton agrees, can be seen as
punishment, but it is not the standard sort that we usually associate
with the term. 96  Nor does she say that "forced therapy" alone is
necessarily an adequate response to rape, though it may be a wise part
of a retributive reaction.97  Instead, she rightly maintains that
punishment must be proportional to injury (that is, to the degree of
98diminishment). Where an injury is more than de minimis, or an
apology fails, punishment by the state is required.99
92. Id.
93. See Hampton, supra, note 85, at 1697-98.
94. See id. at 1685, 1690.
95. See id. at 1690,
96. Id. at 1687-99.
97. See id. at 1690. Hampton does not fully explain the forced therapy example as I
have done here, but I believe my explanation captures what she was driving at, given the tenor
of her piece in its entirety.
98. See id. at 1685, 1690, 694. Hampton goes on to say that not all retributive responses
need to be in the form of punishment. See id. at 1694-95. She even goes so far as to say that
"turning the other cheek" can sometimes be an adequate retributive response:
[St.] Paul argues that it [turning the other cheek] can be the equivalent of
"heaping burning coals on someone's head"--hardly a "nice" thing to do.
How does a beneficent response toward an enemy accomplish this? The
pain Paul describes comes from the emotions of humiliation and shame,
which kindness can evoke in us when we are benefited by those whom we
have wronged. Such treatment startles us, prompts us to rethink how our
responses to our benefactor have been so much uglier than our victim's
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Having thus laid out why the law serves retributive needs in a
way that education, exhortation, and apology in civil society often
behavior toward us, and (assuming we have a decent conscience) makes us
ashamed of what we have done. Through that shame we are humbled.
The person we have wronged has defeated us, and robbed us of our
pretense of elevation over him. We are chastened, just as surely as if we
had been punished.
Id. at 1694. Hampton eloquently reminds her readers of the scope of possible retributive
responses, urging creativity in their design. See id. at 1690-91. Nor is she, on the other hand,
overly soft-hearted, recognizing that "turning the other cheek" is not an appropriate response
by the state where the offender's conscience will be unmoved or the offense is a serious one.
See id. at 1691 ("From a retributive point of view, punishments that are too lenient are as bad
as (sometimes worse than) punishments that are too severe.") Rather than quibble over what
is a "punishment" and what not, I label all state-imposed retributive responses "punishments."
99. See id. at 1690, 1697-98 (noting the availability of apology, combined with "making
amends," as a potential remedy, but also noting that, "The more awful the wrong, the larger
the purported gulf between wrongdoer and victim, and thus the more substantial the
punishment must be in order to defeat the wrongdoer and thereby deny his claim to
superiority.").
Because of Hampton's emphasis on the good results of retributive punishment-the
expression and receipt of a message of equality-at least one scholar has argued that her
theory is not truly classified as "retributive," such theories supposedly justifying punishment
entirely as an end in itself and not because of any good it brings about. See BARTON, supra
note 53, at 89-90. I see no value in entering this debate. Hampton calls her own theory
retributivist, and the term nicely distinguishes communicative retributivism from such
justifications for punishment as deterrence and isolation, which stress prevention of future
crime caused by current penalties or fear of their future imposition. See, e.g., PRIMORATZ,
supra note 53, at 62-81. Communicative retributivism instead focuses on correcting past
messages of subordination with current and future messages of equal human dignity. In any
event, Hampton's account of"retributivism" is the basis for the sense in which I use the term.
Moreover, I do not see Hampton's theory and Professor Barton's as inconsistent.
Barton posits that humans are by nature social beings who most flourish and achieve their full
humanity in a moral community. See BARTON, supra note 53, at 93. He defines a moral
community as a community of morally responsible individuals who hold each other
accountable for wrongs to fellow members and to the common good. See id. Such
accountability consists of liability for blame and punishment for such wrongs apart from
whether the punishment achieves other instrumental goals. See id. Individual flourishing and
achieving full humanity are goods worth achieving; therefore just retributive punishment
should be pursued unless countervailing instrumental considerations require otherwise. See id.
I am not convinced that Barton's theory is any less consequential and more truly
"retributive" than Hampton's, despite his efforts to demonstrate this distinction. See id. at 94-
97. More importantly, however, I agree that just retributive punishment plays a role in
building the social bonds that define a community. See infra text accompanying notes 231-32.
But I also believe that the messages of equal human dignity sent by such punishment are both
independently important, a point Barton seems to concede, see BARTON, supra note 53, at 89-
90, and part of the mechanisms by which shared membership in a moral community
promoting human flourishing is achieved. See generally KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO
AMERICA (1993).
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cannot, I now turn to a preliminary examination (to be fleshed out
further later) of why group-subordinating speech in particular
justifiably elicits retributive desires in its victims.
2. The Retributive Needs Stemming From Harmful Speech
Group-subordinating speech often creates an especially
powerful retributive need. When a person is demeaned because of his
membership in a group, he is denied individualized justice; his demand
to be "treated as unique, a 'universe of one."' 100 Individualized justice
rejects classifying others as a stereotype, a mere member of a category,
because stereotyping another rejects the belief that each human life is
of infinite, irreplaceable value. 10 1 The need for individualized justice
has deep psychological roots and is felt by everyone in our culture. 0 2
Philosopher William James put it this way:
[A]ny object that is infinitely important to us and
awakens our devotion feels to us also as if it must be sui
generis and unique. Probably a crab would be filled
with a sense of personal outrage if it could hear us class
it without ado or apology as a crustacean and thus
dispose of it. "I am not such thing," it would say, "I am
MYSELF, MYSELF alone."'
10 3
But human uniqueness is partly a function of the intersection
among the groups with whom we identify. Our gender, religion,
political party affiliation, among other group connections, define, in
part, our sense of who we uniquely are. Stereotyping a person based
on group membership thus demeans a core part of his identity.'0 5
100. Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological
Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REv. 1, 4 (1993) (quoting DONALD SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE
PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION 101, 108 (1983)) [hereinafter Myself
Alone].
101. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 746-47.
102. See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 100, at 14-24; Taslitz, Racist Personality,
supra note 23, at 746-58; Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through
Multiculturalism: The Liberals'Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1113-18 (1996).
103. WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 29-30 (1978) (based on
lectures delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-1902).
104. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 752.
105. See TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 26, at 134-45.
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Correspondingly, both the individual and other members of his group
see the injuries as group injuries as well. The individual and his group
recognize that their fates are linked. 10 6 Thus, speech that belittles a
group as a whole and not any specific member is nevertheless
perceived by many members as personal attacks on them.'1 7 This sort
of insult strikes so deeply at the core of individual and group identity
that it often evokes retributive anger. 10 8 Often, by society's imposing
suffering on the wrongdoer, his sins can be expiated and the message
of his evil cause rejected.'0 9
Note that the extent to which this retributive need must be met
by the legal system rather than by apology is contextual. In some
group-subordinating speech Contexts, such as face-to-face insults and
threats of harassment by a superior in the workplace, fear and self-
interest may make it unlikely that a victim will step forward to
complain without the security of legal protection.11 In other
instances, ignorance, ill will, or indifference make apologies unlikely
or ineffective."' In such instances*, only the law, and not civil society,
can meet retributive needs.
A further comment is necessary on the role of motive in this
retributive process. It is true that retributive needs are most deeply felt
when we perceive another's actions to have been done with the desire
to hurt our group, or us, rather than because of inadvertence or
indifference.1 2 That observation is also, of course, true of group-
106. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, 758-65. See also RICHARD DELGADO
& JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? 4-11 (1997) (noting the harms of racial insults);
THE PRICE WE PAY (RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC eds., 1996) (discussing harms of
group-subordinating speech more generally); Matsuda, supra note 50, at 24-26 (exploring
harms to individuals from racist hate messages directed against the groups to which the
individuals belong).
107. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 746-65.
108. See id. at 746-65. Remember that suffering need not, however, be in the form of
criminal punishment. See infra text accompanying notes 220-66. On the communicative
nature of punishment and character morality, see Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 23, at 3,
45-64.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 285-303.
110. See Abel, supra note 1, at 217-18. (noting the importance of providing the security
to enable victims to come forward); infra text accompanying notes 394-412 (using sexual
harassment as an example).
111. See Abel, supra note 1, at 254-74.
112. See, e.g., Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 100, at 14-16 (asserting intentional
wrongs are seen as more culpable than accidental ones); Vidmar, supra note 49, at 43, 57
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subordinating speech. Professor Abel argues that difficulty in
determining the motives behind such speech is one of the reasons that
the law is ill-equipped to aid in resolving these disputes.' 13
Yet in the criminal justice system, "motive" is proven every
day. 114 The fear that motive is hard to prove and may be interpreted
differently by different parties misconceives the nature of mental state
requirements in the law. Mental states are for all practical purposes
linguistic concepts.11 5  In thinking and feeling, we partly talk to
ourselves. 16 But we may not fully understand our feelings or we may
engage in self-deception." 7  Every feeling and thought must thus be
interpreted. If, for example, I experience a quickened heart, a racing
pulse, and a sweating brow, did I feel fear, anxiety, or eager
anticipation? We "know" it as one emotion or another when we name
it, and that naming involves value judgments and our own knowledge
of our history and behavior. 118 Because we can engage in self-
delusion or lack information necessary to fairly naming our thoughts
and feelings, others are necessarily involved in this naming process as
well. 1 9 When the law labels a motive as an inappropriate one,
therefore, the community expresses its norms and values through an
act of interpretation. "Motive" in the law is thus not something "out
there" to be found, but something to be created by the community in
dialogue with the speaker. 120
(stating retributive response is most likely where an injury is perceived as intentionally
inflicted).
113. See Abel, supra note 1, at 303-04.
114. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 753-58.
115. Space constraints make my summary here of the argument that mental states are
linguistic concepts a truncated one. Readers familiar with the philosophy of mind will have
objections. For a fuller statement of my position on these questions, see generally Andrew E.
Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Scientific Evidence: Foundations, 5 MICH. J. GENDER
& L. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Feminist Approach].
116. See id. at 12-27.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 20-24.
119. See id. at 21-25.
120. See id. at 25-26. (explaining the jury's role as a party to this dialogue); Andrew E.
Taslitz, Abuse Excuses and the Logic and Politics of Expert Relevance, 49 HASTINGS L. J.
1039, 1050-56 (1998) (stating how the jury must engage in "dialogic thinking" to understand
another's mental state).
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The trial thus serves, in part, as a public evaluation, a moral
performance of public values in the process of labeling mental state.1 21
A trial, by engaging in this public performance, can reaffirm values of
inclusion and equality when a group or group member claims injury
from subordinating speech.12 2 That may sometimes be true even when
plaintiffs lose, both because a fair process giving all participants an
effective voice itself expresses respect for those participants123 and
because plaintiffs' loss may be based on the conclusion that no insult
was intended or fairly perceived-an implicit acknowledgment that the
plaintiff is worthy of compensation where harm is intended.
Importantly, I am not arguing for show trials to achieve some
pre-determined result. I do believe that there are historical facts that
are true or false in our everyday understanding of these terms. 124 For
example, did Johnny hit George, or was Waldo the assailant? That
question has an "objectively" true or false answer. Furthermore, a
defendant's mental state must be inferred from historically true
facts. 125  Thus, if Johnny was indeed the assailant, did Johnny first
scream, "I won't let you touch me, George!," suggesting that Johnny
believed that he acted in self-defense, or did Johnny instead scream,
"You're going to die for sleeping with my wife!," suggesting that
Johnny instead understood that he was the initial assailant, acting in a
jealous rage.
In many real trials, even once a jury knows the historical truth
of what was said and done, the parties' actions and words are far more
121. See Taslitz, supra note 115, at 34-46. On trials as moral performances more
generally, see ROBERT BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL (1999); SAM SCHRAGER, THE TRIAL
LAWYERS' ART (1999); STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH (2000).
122. See TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 26, at 103-13, 134-48 (1999)
(explaining how trial processes can promote or hamper group inclusion and respect); Andrew
E. Taslitz, What Feminism Has To Offer Evidence Law, 28 S. W. L. REV. 171, 179-187 (1999)
(investigating how evidence law and trial practices help to constitute wider social relationships
and perceptions of reality) [hereinafter What Feminism Has To Offer].
123. See TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 26 (noting the value of an effective
voice for women in rape trials); Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and Justice: The Fourth
Amendment From the Bottom Up (draft manuscript) (summarizing social science data on how
legal procedures affect group perceptions of respect).
124. See generally Taslitz, supra note 115, at 28-33.
125. See id. at 28-46.
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ambiguous than in the Johnny-George example.' 6  Giving such
actions and words meaning therefore requires an act of interpretation,
involving. in part, the infusion of the jurors' values.' 27 When Desiree
Washington agreed to come to boxer Mike Tyson's room at 1:00 a.m.,
did she do so with the expectation of having consensual sexual
intercourse, or was she instead an innocent, enticed there by Tyson,
and subsequently raped? 12 8  If Washington and Tyson tell different
stories, jurors' values may affect whom they believe. 129 But, even if
the stories as to the historical facts were the same, whether the events
constituted "consent" is not a simple true or false question. Values
inevitably affect how the jury characterizes the events that it concludes
occurred. 130  Indeed, say many commentators, it is a virtue of our
democracy that we thereby involve the people, through the institution
of the jury, in making and applying law.'3  If the jury believed that
Washington was an innocent taken advantage of by a self-centered
Tyson focused on his own pleasure and indifferent to Washington's
needs, yet found that Washington nevertheless "consented," that sends
an important message about the relative status of men and women:
men can, within certain broad limits, use women entirely as means to
serve male desires; women who object to that judgment thus better
have the wisdom to stay out of the way or the physical and emotional
strength to fight off their attackers.' 32 The rules of evidence must thus
continue to respect historical truth, but it is important to recognize that
trials simultaneously send messages about Social norms and about the
126. See generally TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 26, at 44-57, 81-99
(illustrating ambiguities over whether the alleged victim in several infamous rape trials
"consented").
127. See Taslitz, supra note 115, at 25-26, 49-57.
128. See TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 26, at 49-53 (discussing the Mike
Tyson rape trial).
129. See id at 67-80 (summarizing mechanisms by which values embodied in linguistic
practices affect rape victim credibility).
130. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I Cultural Rape Narratives in the
Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 387, 419-24 (1996) (discussing how values
affect the meaning that jurors give to historical "facts" in gauging consent in a rape trial).
131. See generally JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE
IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY (1994); CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION, THE EVOLUTION OF A
DOCTRINE (1998); NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAW
(1995); JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES AND POLITICS (1992).
132. See Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 23, at 52-64 (arguing social messages sent by
rape trial verdicts validate male indifference to female sexual autonomy).
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relative status of both individuals and salient social groups. Group-
subordinating speech liability trials are especially likely to involve this
expressive function because the victim's specific claim is usually that
the offender sought to diminish the victim and his salient social
group. 13
3
Ill motive, however, is not always necessary to stirring
retributive impulses. Indifference to another's grave suffering is often
perceived as a species of evil, and the speaker as therefore of an evil
character.134 Merely creating a risk of harm to another where the harm
is great, and the indifference to its eventuation evident, can breed
retributive anger. 35  The sexual harassment regulations under Title
VII, which permit liability for severe, repeated, and pervasive
conduct, 136 even absent proof of ill will, can partly be seen as
assuaging precisely this sort of retributive anger. 1
37
Retribution is not always called for, and, when it is, it must be
measured and proportionate.' But sometimes it is the only way to
restore fully individual and group status by public denunciation of
133. See TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 26, at 109-13 (messages rape trials
send about groups' social status); Taslitz, supra note 115, at 28-46 (illustrating respective
roles of historical versus values-infused truth at trials); Taslitz, Racist Personality supra note
23 (arguing that hate crimes cases involve especially clear and powerful messages concerning
group-subordination); see also SCHRAGER, supra note 121, at 1-16 (characterizing the social
communicative function as an attribute of trials generally, not simply rape trials); Andrew E.
Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer, supra note 122, 179-87, 199 (1999) (noting evidence
law's "constitutive" function in contributing to messages helping to create the kind of a
society that is the American community).
Those interested in more detailed treatments of when group and individualized
justice are in harmony and when in tension should see DAVID INGRAM, GROUP RIGHTS:
RECONCILING EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE (2000); RONALD J. FISCUSS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LOGIC OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1992). It is useful to note here that suits vindicating harms
done to individuals by group-subordinating speech necessarily champion the part of the
victim's unique nature that is constituted by his connection to his racial, ethnic, religious,
gendered, or other salient group. Cf Taslitz, Racist Personally, supra note 23, at 758-65
(making similar point in the context of hate crimes). There should, therefore, be no tension
between group and individualized justice. See generally, DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note
106 (defending role of group justice in tort suits based on group-subordinating speech).
134. See Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 23, at 62-65.
135. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 762-65.
136. See Taslitz, Still Officers of the Court, supra note 26, at 830-33.
137. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 780-85; see infra text
accompanying notes 244-66 (discussing why sexual harassment law meets retributive needs).
138. See infra text accompanying notes 163-77.
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status-demeaning messages.' 39 Moreover, the catharsis that retribution
achieves, the increased sense. of self-respect it calls forth, and the
equalizing it encourages between the status of offender and victim may
create the opportunity for meaningful dialogue in civil society that
would not otherwise be available.14
0
3. Limits on Retributive Punishment in Criminal Cases
Retributive punishment is limited by a variety of
considerations. In this section, I briefly outline some of the more
important general constraints. Although these constraints apply to all
state-imposed retributive punishment, my emphasis here is on the
criminal justice system, in which the idea of retribution is most often
embraced. Starting with the criminal system enables us to see its
weaknesses, as well as its strengths, as a mechanism for imposing
punishment. The next section (Section IB) then elaborates on the
general constraints by exploring when the civil justice system might be
a better vehicle than the criminal system for meeting retributive needs.
(a) Retributive Anger Must Be Condoned Only Where It Is
Consistent with Political Morality
The state may not impose punishment on a purported offender
simply because his alleged victims feel retributive anger. That anger
must be justified by resorting to fundamental political values. 14a  The
American constitutional republic accords high value in theory, if not
always in practice, to values of equality and human dignity. 141 In
139. See Vidmar, supra note 49, at 35-47 (arguing retribution diffuses psychological
tension, and restores group cohesion and the victimized party's status); Taslitz, Racist
Personality, supra note 23, at 746-65 (retribution and equality); infra text accompanying notes
220-43.
140. See infra text accompany notes 412-34.
141. See, e.g., Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 765-77 (explaining why hate
crimes legislation's retributive goals are consistent with American political morality); accord
MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 88, at 48-49 (describing why the law cannot countenance
retributive anger felt by whites compelled to have contact with blacks in public places).
142. See Taslitz, Racist Personality supra note 23, at 765-77; see generally GEORGE
FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: How LINCOLN REDEFINED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(2001). (arguing that the "secret" commitment of the post-Civil War Constitution to certain
notions of equality and nationhood is now being told); KENNETH KARST, BELONGING To
AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989) (noting America's growing
historical commitment to equal belonging in a common political community); J.R. POLE, THE
[VOL. 1:305330
THE INADEQUACIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY
particular, the Republic purports to reject subordination of persons or
groups based on race, ethnicity, gender, and political or religious
belief.143 Whether subordination may be permitted based on sexual
orientation is (sadly) a question with which our political culture
continues to struggle.' 44  Nevertheless, equality and dignity-related
values implicating the sorts of group-based harms that our
constitutional culture accepts should limit what retributive anger the
law validates. Correspondingly, social reformers can work to expand
the circle of groups protected, as the gay rights movement is now
doing, further imposing limits on what our legal-system acknowledges
as legitimate retributive outrage. 1
45
For example, "A white person who is forced to sit next to a
black person on a bus might believe this demeans her by making it
appear that they are of equal rank and value and should thus be
accorded equal treatment."'' 46  Yet it would violate fundamental
equality principles for the law to punish the black passengers for
"insulting" the white racist. Indeed, to do otherwise marks blacks as
inferior, whites as superior.' 4 7 Sending that message is precisely what
Jim Crow racial segregation laws and their enforcement did. 14  Since
the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education,149 white
superiority is a message our legal culture rejects.' 50 On the other hand,
PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2d rev. ed. 1993) (tracing the changing
meaning of equality for Americans of different occupational classes, ethnicities, religions, and
genders). But see ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN
U.S. HISTORY (1997) (arguing American history simultaneously embodies a commitment to
two conflicting traditions, one of egalitarianism, the other of ascriptive inequality).
143. See sources cited supra note 142.
144. See, e.g., PATRICIA CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN
THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2000) (tracing the history of the struggle
for gay rights); JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS
v. THE SUPREME COURT (2001) (describing the history of evolution of United States Supreme
Court doctrine on gay rights); DAVID L. RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS:
RACE, GENDER, RELIGION AS ANALOGIES (1999) (arguing for a constitutional theory of gay
rights).
145. See sources cited supra note 144.
146. MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 88, at 49.
147. See id; KARST, supra note 142, at 15-27.
148. See KARST, supra note 142, at 15-27.
149. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding segregation by race in public schools is
unconstitutional).
150. See Charles Lawrence, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, in WORDS THAT
WOUND, supra note 50, at 53, 59-76.
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these same equality concerns weigh in favor of the law's validating the
retributive anger of an African-American victim of racist hate speech
or of a female employee victimized by the sexually demeaning
remarks of co-workers.'"
Harder cases arise where the injured parties both feel
retributive anger toward each other. Consider this hypothetical: An
African-American driving in a largely black neighborhood hits and
kills an Orthodox Jewish child, then leaves the scene. 152  Enraged
members of the adjacent Orthodox Jewish community assault a local
African-American pedestrian in retaliation. Each group angrily
maintains that the other group has demeaned it. Whose anger, if
anyone's, should the state redress?
The answer depends on additional facts. Suppose that the
African-American driver was aware that he had hit an Orthodox
Jewish child, albeit accidentally, but did not care enough to stop and
offer aid because Orthodox Jews were not worth the trouble. The
victim, his family, and the entire Orthodox community would have
been treated as of less than equal worth with the driver. Still worse, if
the driver intentionally ran down the pedestrian because he was
Jewish, then the driver expressed a particularly intense message of
Jewish worthlessness. 1
53
If the driver, however, was instead not aware that he had hit
anyone at all, then he cannot be seen as intentionally expressing
superiority over his victim. Nevertheless, if he was driving so
carelessly as to show indifference toward the fate of any pedestrian-
whether Jewish or not-his ignorance may not excuse him from some
retributive punishment. The driver has still expressed a belief that
151. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 755-62 (arguing retributive anger
stems from the messages in hate crimes); infra text accompanying notes 244-63, 354-60
(discussing retributive anger from "pure" hate speech and hostile environment sexual
harassment).
152. ELI B. SILVERMAN, NYPD BATTLES CRIME 76-81 (1999). This example is a
variation on the Crown Heights case in New York City, which has received extensive news
coverage. There, an Orthodox Jewish motorist hit a young African-American child. I have
reversed the facts in my hypothetical in the hope that it will help each side to see the other's
perspective in this emotionally-charged case, as well as altering other facts to better serve the
purposes of illustration I seek to achieve here.
153. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, 746-65 (noting group and individual
injuries from intentional, violent hate crimes); Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 23, at 52-55
(listing circumstances under which indifference to another's suffering merits criminal
punishment).
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taking care to protect others from injury while he goes about achieving
his daily goals is not worth his time. But his punishment should be
lighter than in the first two instances because his message is both less
intense and less harmful. 
155
Correspondingly, if the African-American whom the Orthodox
Jews attacked was not simply chosen at random, but was instead the
Jewish victim's actual killer, and if that killer had intended specifically
to kill a Jewish victim, then the intensity of the Jewish community's
retributive desires was appropriate. Their acting on those desires was
unacceptable, however. For the reasons noted earlier in this article,
victims of crime cannot themselves be trusted to mete out fair
punishment. That task is for the state to perform, both on the victim's
behalf and on behalf of the wider political community. 156 The Jewish
assailants, furthermore, by ignoring the broader political community's
need for order, themselves merit punishment for taking matters into
their own hands. 157 Still worse, if the Orthodox group attacked a
random African-American-and not the actual killer of the Orthodox
child-retributive anger toward the randomly chosen pedestrian is not
justified. That anger simply demeans the entire African-American
community. Punishing both the black driver and the white Orthodox
Jewish assailants for diminishing the equal human value of their
respective victims might therefore be appropriate.
But there is at least one more possibility. The driver may have
acted perfectly reasonably, hitting a darting child who was too small
for the driver to see, despite the driver's exercise of extreme care.
Similarly, the Orthodox Jewish group may not even have been the
154. See Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 23, at 52-55 (examining the role of
indifference in criminal law).
155. See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 100, at 15 (arguing negligently and recklessly
inflicting harms do not merit the "full" moral responsibility required by intentions); See
generally Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23 (stating why messages of group-
subordination based on race, gender, ethnic, and other stereotypes do more harm than similar
crimes that lack group-based animus or indifference).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 64-71. The wider political community must
express indignation at the driver's insult to the Jewish victim's equal value. See Taslitz,
Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 749-53.
157. See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Mobs and Vigilante Justice, in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW (forthcoming 2002) (explaining how vigilantism, if ever
justified at all, was historically justified as necessary when formal legal mechanisms broke
down, a possibility assumed away by my hypothetical).
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ones responsible for the attack on the local African-American
pedestrian. Rather, the local African-American community may have
assumed that the Orthodox Jews had to have committed this new
assault, both because the Jews had a retaliatory motive and because of
stereotypes about Jews being vindictive and deceptive. In that case,
each group's anger stems from ignorance of the true circumstances or
from prejudiced beliefs about the intentions and behavior of the other
group. Consequently, neither the driver nor the wrongly accused
Orthodox Jews merit punishment.
Similar examples can easily be imagined in the case of hate
speech. Much of Professor Abel's article indeed draws on a wide
range of real life harmful speech disputes among minority groups.
Professor Abel particularly worries that misunderstandings about
mutual intentions make the law a blunt instrument.1 58 Certainly he is
right that efforts at understanding and mutual apology should be made.
But where they fail to achieve resolution, the law must step in.
When the law does act, similar values analyses can be
undertaken even where racial, gender, or related animus or
indifference is not even arguably involved. Thus, as I noted above,
any hit-and-run where the driver is aware of what he has done rightly
merits retributive punishment on that score alone.
On the other hand, if you perceive that your neighbor bought a
purple car specifically because he knows you despise purple, your
desire to get even is not one calling for legal intervention, even if your
perception is correct. You might retaliate by buying a car that is a
color that you know your offending neighbor despises too. But the
law will stay out of a dispute too silly for it to dignify. More precisely,
the insult involved is de minimis because it does not interfere with any
values that the state as a political entity deems worthy of protection.
There is an important symmetry here. The law makes
judgments every day about what emotions it sanctions that spurred an
alleged offender to do wrong.1 59 A killer who acts in the "heat of
passion" is punished less severely if he was "reasonably provoked"
into such passion by his victim.1 60  Yet, the law traditionally
158. See Abel, supra note 1, at 303-04.
159. See Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 23, at 9-12.
160. Id. at 9-12; JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 527-36 (3d ed.
2001).
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recognizes only certain sorts of triggers for offender passion as
"reasonable."' 16  Passion never justifies killing, but some passion
merits our compassion, some not.162 Similarly, the retributive passion
of victims and not only offenders must be assessed as more or less
morally appropriate or not.
(b) Retributive Punishment Must be Proportionate
Retributive punishment must be proportionate. 163  This
requirement is sometimes phrased as exchanging "like-for-like," a
measure of punishment equal in value to the suffering that the offender
imposed on his victim.164 The like-for-like formula sounds intuitively
right and captures an important core of the idea of proportionality.
But, if like-for-like means equivalent suffering only, then the aphorism
does not fully express how society determines what is a measured and
reasonable, that is, a proportionate, response to wrongdoing because
the same acts and harms in practice routinely result in different
punishments based upon the offender's often unexpressed mental
state. 16
5
That is in part why the hit-and-run driver example above could
be resolved only by first determining the intentions of the varying
parties. There were several inter-related questions involved there: (1)
What meaning could fairly be ascribed to the driver's or the Orthodox
Jews' actions simpliciter?; (2) Does that meaning justify retributive
anger, and, if so, to what degree?; and (3) Does our knowledge of the
driver's or the Orthodox Jews' intentions alter the answer to either of
the first two questions? What is important about this last question is
that a "yes" answer assumes that punishment can be mitigated or even
foregone for one offender who causes the same victim suffering as
161. See DRESSLER, supra note 160, at 527-36.
162. See Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 23, at 9-12.
163. See BARTON, supra note 53, at 44, 60-62.
164. Professor Solomon uses the "like-for-like" phrase, finding it a less misleading way
to identify the proportionality concept than the even-more-frequently-used aphorism, "evil-
for-evil." My specific explanation of the phrase tailors it to Professor Hampton's version of
communicative retributivism. See Hampton, supra note 85, at 1689-92.
165. See Hampton, supra note 85, at 1690 (rejecting the "lex talionis" of an "eye for an
eye" prescription if it means that punishment must inflict the same sort of harm as was done
by the offender); Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 100, at 14-16 (noting punishment varies
with mental state culpability even where otherwise the same harms are inflicted).
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another offender but with a less depraved mental state.' 66 Individual
resentment and social indignation in fact do decline as we move from
purposeful, to knowing, to reckless, to merely negligent conduct.
167
Our society indeed answers, "yes" to question number three.
But there is an important consequence stemming from the very
process of determining the offender's mental state. Fairly judging
mental state requires the fact finder to know a good deal about the
offender's situation and character.' 68 Whether a wife shot her husband
to prevent him from attacking her or whether she did so from greedy
impatience to inherit his fortune can be determined only by studying
the detailed history of their relationship, the wife's strengths or
weaknesses of personality, and the economic and social prospects she
faces with, versus without, her husband alive.' 69 Yet the very process
of receiving this information can further soften retributive anger:
The more intimately we know others, the more familiar
we are with their motivation, circumstances, the
information they have, and the constraints under which
they operate, the less likely it is that we would be
willing to allow their evil actions to reflect on their
characters. Intimate understanding of human conduct
tends to reveal complexities disguised from superficial
acquaintances. These complexities, then, function as
excuses, preventing us from judging the agents of evil
actions as harshly as would be entailed by calling them,
and not only their actions, evil. 1
70
166. See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 100, at 14-16, 21. Strictly speaking, the
suffering in each of the two cases is not necessarily the same. If the victim and society believe
after trial that the offender's mental state was less culpable than originally assumed (e.g.,
negligent rather than purposeful), the message of diminishment may be perceived as less
intense. In this sense, less harm is done where mental state is less depraved.
167. See id. at 21.
168. See id. at 14-20.
169. See id. at 91-102 (arguing the value of history and context in gauging offender
mental state); Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 115, at 57-68 (recounting "lessons
learned" from the battered woman syndrome about the importance of temporally extended
contextual evidence in mental state determination).
170. JOHN KEKES, FACING EVIL 5-6 (1990).
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This "soft reaction to evil" 171 does not mean that fact finders do
not, or that the law should not, assess character as a basis for gauging
punishment. Indeed, our ready willingness to assume evil character in
persons who by their actions send subordinating messages has much to
do with the strength of our retributive responses. 172 Fuller knowledge
of a person's circumstances allows us to see him as less than wholly,
irredeemably evil. We appreciate the complexity of his nature, the
combination of good and evil traits of varying intensity that constitute
most humans' nature. We thus can reject the evil in him without
rejecting him entirely from the family of man. 173 Whether a fact finder
learns these details importantly turns on the law of evidence.
Evidentiary law, improperly conceived or applied, can thus undercut
an important constraint on retribution. 1
74
A second factor in proportionality analysis is the intensity of
the demeaning message sent by an offender's crime. That message
intensity varies in part with the degree of harm inflicted or risked.
75
This concept returns us to the "like-for-like" formulation and can be a
powerful limiting principle. As one commentator queried, "But in
what way is a brief prison term 'fit' punishment for any crime? In
what way is unemployment or a ruined reputation 'like for like,'
except in exceptional cases?"' 176 Even in the "exceptional" cases, a
careful attention to the harms inflicted by and on an offender can limit
punishment. The well-respected existentialist philosopher, Albert
Camus, made this point concerning the death penalty:
For there to be equivalence, the death penalty would
have to punish a criminal who had warned his victim of
171. Id.
172. See Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 23, at 48-52 (defending a character-based
moral retributivism, relying in part on the work of philosopher John Kekes); Taslitz, Racist
Personality, supra note 23, at 743-45, 753-58 (similar point in hate crimes prosecutions).
173. See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 115, at 334-46 (contextual testimony can
produce a more appropriate degree ofjuror empathy); Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 100, at
14-30 (contextualized testimony improves the accuracy of culpability degree determinations);
Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 780-85 (importance of respecting all persons as
within the "family of man.").
174. See sources cited supra note 173.
175. See Hampton, supra note 85, at 1690-92.
176. Solomon, supra note 32, at 138.
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the date at which he would inflict a horrible death on
him and who, from that moment onward, had confirmed
him at his mercy for months. Such a monster is not
encountered in private life.'77
(c) Punishment Must Respect the Offender's Equal Worth As A
Person
The like-for-like principle is itself limited by the idea of equal
human dignity that is at the heart of the theory of communicative
retributive justice. This idea requires that the state be barred from
imposing a punishment on the offender that is so extreme that it
disregards his fundamental equal worth as a human being. 178 This
vague and imprecise formulation nevertheless seems to underlie some
judgments that are no longer controversial in American society:
[T]here are ... occasions when the wrongdoer's deed
has been so violative of the victim's dignity that doing
the same to him would strike us as morally indecent or
repulsive. For example, if he tortured or removed body
parts of his victim, or threw acid on his victim's face,
then doing the same to him would certainly "defeat"
him, but in a way that also denied his worth as a human
being. The ... value of both offender and victim [must]
be recognized in a retributive response; to do otherwise
is to use punishment in a hateful attempt to degrade the
wrongdoer and represent him as worth less than other
human beings. 179
There are instances where the moral consensus concerning
other punishments is more ambiguous. The debate over the death
penalty, for example, can in part be seen as a debate about whether
177. Albert Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND
DEATH (J. O'Brien trans., 1960).
178. See Hampton, supra note 85, at 1691-93.
179. Id. at 1692, Hampton continues:
While he may be morally worse than others, the Kantian theory of value
insists that he is still an end-in-himself, and thus still someone whose
value requires respect. Id.
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entirely snuffing out a person's life disrespects his minimal
fundamental value held simply by nature of his humanity. 18 0
But there is another and perhaps unexpected corollary of
understanding the importance of vindicating the worth of both the
offender and his victim. Consider a poor inner-city teen living in an
ugly, dangerous, and impoverished neighborhood. He is already on
society's lowest rungs. Indeed, if he is black, he is already at least
subconsciously perceived by many whites as in some sense sub-
human, a dangerous "pollutant" to be exiled to other neighborhoods
than theirs or to prison. "To permit children to grow up in situations
where they are often in danger, where they do not get enough to eat,
where they are unable to get adequate health care, and where their
schools are ineffective or worse, is to permit severe value-
diminishment."' 8 1  Such a teen would be entitled to experience
retributive anger at a society that contributed to his condition. But
recognition of his own worth might require society also to repair the
harm it has done to him.' 82 Such repair might justify mitigating his
punishment and giving him an opportunity for a quality education or a
chance to learn job skills.' 83 If this is right, a sensible scheme of
retributive punishment might also demand mercy and rehabilitation.
84
The example also illustrates the connection between retributive and
distributive justice. A society committed to retributive justice may be
required to aspire toward greater equality in how it distributes goods
and services to free it from the taint of demeaning its own citizens.1
8 5
(d) Fair Procedures
Retributive punishment assumes that we have identified the
correct person as the wrongdoer; that we have accurately determined
the historical facts; and that we have fully informed the fact finder of
180. See id. at 1692. Hampton notes the debate, but is reluctant to say that the death
penalty is in fact inappropriate.
181. Id. at 1699.
182. See id. (using similar example).
183. See id.
184. "Mercy" means foregoing the full extent of punishment that law and morality
permit. See BARTON, supra note 53, at 97-100.
185. See Hampton, supra note 85, at 1699-1700.
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all it needs to know to make the combined factual/moral judgment of
with what mental state the offender acted. 186  Procedures likely to
foster accuracy are therefore required. But procedures themselves
send important messages about the values society assigns to trial
participants, as empirical work on procedural justice has
demonstrated. 87  Procedures aspiring toward historical accuracy,
unbiased decision-making, and a full and fair opportunity for the
defendant's story to be heard are essential aspects of a just retributive
morality.'
88
(e) Retribution Must Not Unduly Interfere With Other Social
Goals
Retributive needs must always be balanced against other social
goals, including other goals of punishment.' 89  Incarceration alone
might be inadequate to rehabilitate an offender or to deter him from
future crime. Indeed, there is reason to believe that incarceration often
further educates inmates in the ways of criminality. 190 A sentence
adequate to deter other potential future offenders may need to be
longer or shorter than what retribution requires. A new approach,
"restorative justice," seeks to repair the harm crime does to the
offender, the victim, and their local communities. 191  Restorative
justice is not inconsistent with retribution. 192  Indeed, retributive
186. See BARTON, supra note 53, at 49 (arguing just retributive punishment "must not be
imposed on the wrong person, an innocent person who is not appropriately responsible for the
offense in question" and "should not be imposed without due process, without giving the
accused a fair chance to argue and defend their case"); Taslitz, MyselfAlone, supra note 100,
at 14-30 (noting the importance of fully informing the fact finder).
187. See generally Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice in HANDBOOK OF
JUSTICE RESEARCH IN: LAW, 65-99 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001)
(summarizing current research on procedural justice).
188. See id.
189. See Hampton, supra note 85, at 1700-02.
190. See Gordon Bazemore, Communities, Victims and Offender Reintegration:
Restorative Justice and Earned Redemption, in CIVIC REPENTANCE 45, 69-72 (describing how
restorative sanctions short of incarceration may sometimes be better at affecting
rehabilitation); CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN AN AGE
OF CRISIS 163-210 (1999).
191. See Bazemore, supra note 190, at 47-58.
192. See id. at 76 (making similar point but arguing that retributive goals must take a
back seat to other restorative ones); BARTON, supra note 53, at 136-38 (arguing restorative and
retributive justice are entirely consistent and do not necessarily require prioritizing one goal
over the other).
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punishment may be necessary for the community to heal and to permit
it to re-integrate the offender. The older Athenian idea of retribution
viewed as a disease of the community, in which retributive anger
signals disordered community relationships, clarifies this point.
193
Because retribution is not about what the individual "deserves" but
what the entire community needs to heal, the focus in choosing a
remedy is broader than in modem conceptions of retributivism.
194
Each individual act of drug use might, in society's view, for example,
merit some degree of incarceration. Yet, if the result of the drug war is
to imprison a huge proportion of African-American males, to deny
them the vote and employment even after they have paid their debt to
society, and to contribute to family breakup and community
disintegration, "healing" may require a different approach.' 95
69 Humility
Finally, if retribution requires character assessment, as
communicative retributivism assumes, we face cognitive obstacles to
making such assessments. It is hard to know what is in another's
mind, much less whether they acted from a "hardened, abandoned and
malignant heart."'196  It is harder still because our own prejudices,
hypocrisy, and self-deception may bias our judgments or lead to
actions motivated more by cruelty than by the desire for vindicating
moral principles. 197 We must, of course, try to make these judgments
as a necessary corollary of the goal of defending our nation's
commitment to the idea of equal human worth. 198 Where the stakes
are especially high, however, as in a criminal case, the risk of error
should make us humble and regretful in going about this task.
193. See Danielle S. Allen, Democratic Dis-ease: Of Anger and the Troubling Nature of
Punishment, in THE PASSIONS OF THE LAW, supra note 32, at 191, 193-203.
194. See id. at 205-06.
195. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 81-123 (1995).
196. Murphy, supra note 83, at 157.
197. See id. at 154-61.
198. See id. at 158-61. I do not address the question of when it is appropriate to forgive.
The meaning of "forgiveness" can be debated, but it refers primarily to a positive change of
heart toward the wrongdoer and perhaps also a willingness to reintegrate him into society. See
MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 88.
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(g) Taking Stock
This section has sought to make two main points. First, there
are significant limitations on the degree and nature of punishment
inherent in the idea of retributive justice. Second, these same
limitations often counsel against criminal punishment as the way to
vindicate retributive needs. These same general conclusions apply to
punishing group-subordinating speech. Punishments must be imposed
only where the recipients are justified in feeling demeaned. Moreover,
the punishments must be proportionate to the offense, achieved via fair
state procedures, and respectful of the offender's worth as a human
being. The harms from group-subordinating speech can be grave, but,
as the next section demonstrates, they usually do not merit criminal
punishment, and, in some cases, countervailing considerations may
mean that there should be no punishment at all. If punishment for
harmful speech is required but criminal penalties are unwise, what
alternatives are available? The next section answers "civil
alternatives, especially via the tort system," while exploring some of
the reasons why no punishment at all may sometimes be the only
viable option.
B. The Role of Retribution in Tort Law
Many advocates of legal regulation of group-subordinating
speech recommend doing so via tort or other civil law, rather than
through criminal prosecution. 199  For example, Richard Delgado
recommends creating a tort for racial insults; sexual harassment is
currently regulated by civil anti-discrimination law and, in the view of
some thinkers, requires further regulation by the tort system; and still
other scholars argue for a tort remedy for group defamation.2° ° Yet
retribution, when accepted as a legitimate goal of the law, is most
often seen as best served by criminal rather than tort or other civil
199. See e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action For Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name Calling, in WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 50; MARGARET A. CROUCH,
THINKING ABOUT SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 176-86 (2001)
(summarizing views of theorists arguing for tortious or other civil, but not usually criminal,
remedies for sexual harassment).
200. See sources cited supra note 199 (on racial insults and sexual harassment); See
generally MONROE FREEDMAN & ERIC FREEDMAN, GROUP DEFAMATION (1995) (discussing
group defamation).
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remedies. 201 To readers versed in tort or criminal law, therefore, my
emphasis on retribution may seem odd.
Tort remedies are most often viewed as serving "corrective
justice," which requires an offender to repair the physical,
psychological, and related wrongful losses (the "harms") that his
conduct causes.202  Wrongful actions are those that violate a moral
standard under the circumstances. 20 3 Retributive justice, or at least the
expressive version of that concept that I rely upon here, does not repair
harms but rather rights moral injuries-injuries to the relative value of
victim and offender in a political culture that assumes that in some
sense all humans are of inherent, objective, equal worth.204
Not all wrongful losses merit retribution. A mother driving her
child home from school in a rainstorm who drives just a tad too fast for
the rainy conditions, skidding into another car and causing it $3500 in
damages, breaches the moral obligation to drive safely. Corrective
justice requires that mom to pay the owner of the other car for the
damage done. Few observers, however, would feel the need for a
205retributive response to the mom's wrongdoing. Her negligent
driving was not intended to demean the other driver's value as a
human being or to elevate the mom's value. 20 6 Nor was the mom so
extremely indifferent to others' needs as to reflect the sort of evil
character that we cry out to denounce. 20 7 Therefore, there is no moral
injury for retributive responses to address.
But some wrongful losses do, or at least should, elicit a
retributive need. In an ordinary assault case, for example, the
assailant, by punching his victim, sends the message, "I am worth
201. See, e.g., Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 23, at 45-64.
202. See Hampton, supra note 85, at 1665-67.
203. See id. at 1666. It is not necessary for my purposes here to explore all the other
types and theories of justice potentially involved in tort law. Corrective justice is the primary
sort usually relied upon and simply helps by contrast to make my point that retribution has a
role to play in civil justice generally and in tort law specifically. For a thorough analysis of
the types of justice involved in tort law, see ALAN CALNAN, JUSTICE AND TORT LAW (1997).
204. See Hampton, supra note 85, at 1661-87.
205. See id. at 1665-66. The example and its analysis are a variation on a similar
discussion by philosopher Jean Hampton.
206. See id. at 1665-66.
207. See Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 23, at 53-55 (portraying indifferent or
insensitive character as "evil," meriting a retributive response).
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more than you, so I am free to treat you as I wish., 20 8  Moreover,
assaults intentionally inflict harms, increasing the strength of a
209retributive response. Philosopher Jean Hampton points out,
however, that there are two potential sources of diminishment in such
wrongful conduct: (1) the act itself and (2) the harm that the act
effects.
210
Beating an assault victim thus itself sends a message of the
victim's diminished worth.211 But a beating might result in lengthy
hospitalization, preventing the victim from securing (at least in the
short run) things to which his inherent human value entitles him, such
as autonomy. 2 2  The harm effected by the act adds to the sense of
diminishment by violating the entitlements that in part constitute the
victim's value. 2 13 An attempted punch to the victim's face that fails to
land is also an act that demeans another. But the missed punch is less
demeaning than the brutal beating because in the former case no loss is
inflicted..
The intensity of retributive needs, of course, varies with
context, and some actions are so reprehensible that they require a
significant retributive response even if no loss results. 2 15 The central
point made here, however, is that an adequate retributive response
208. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Bias Crimes: What Do Haters Deserve?, 11 CRIM. J. ETHICS
22, 22-23 (1992) (explaining the degrading insult in ordinary assault).
209. See Vidmar, supra note 49, at 43-50 (stating the empiricist's view that intentionally-
inflicted harms elicit our greatest desire for retribution); Taslitz, MyselfAlone, supra note 100,
at 21, n. 108 (summarizing similar views by moral philosophers).
210. See Hampton, supra note 85, at 1678-85, 1696-97.
211. The beating sends the message of the victim's reduced, and the offender's elevated,
value, thus constituting "diminishment." See id at 1672-73. "Degradation" would be an actual
reduction in human value, rather than the mere expression of a belief in such reduction, see id.
at 1672-77. Many theories of equal human worth definitionally deny that degradation can
happen because that would mean that certain persons were not then of equal value to that of
other persons. See id. at 1672-77.
212. See id. at 1677-78 (cataloguing many of the entitlements that flow from equal
human worth, including autonomy, bodily integrity, possession of property, and life).
213. See id. at 1677-79.
214. See id. at 1696-97 (discussing attempts). This analysis flows directly from
understanding that actual injuries to entitlements add to the diminishment from the act alone.
See id. at 1677-79.
215. See id. at 1681 (using the example of attempted murder).
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216
sometimes requires compensating for losses. That is a role to which
the tort system is often well-suited.217
Jean Hampton squarely makes this point:
[T]he demand for a wrongdoer to "make amends" to his
victim is a retributive idea, arising from the retributive
claim that repairing diminishment requires, among
other things, repairing the wrongdoer's damage to the
victim's entitlements (generated by her value). A
punishment can have built into it actions or services
that constitute such amends; otherwise, these amends
can be conceived as separate from the punishment, for
example, understood as restitution or as a civil remedy,
in which case the retributive response would have to be
understood as including not only punishment (which
would be primarily concerned with repairing damage to
the acknowledgment of the victim's value), but also
these remedies. Tort remedies can therefore function as
part of a retributive response, although as I noted in
discussing the case of Mary, the poor driver, they need
not do so. 21
8
216. See id. at 1696-97; CALNAN, supra note 203, at 111-18 (also arguing that tort
retribution plays a role, even where punitive damages, often conceived as serving a retributive
purpose, are not involved). The existence of a system of insurance does not necessarily vitiate
the retributive component of the tort compensation scheme. For example, insurance policies
often exclude coverage for punitive damages and many, though not most, states void punitive
damages coverage as against public policy precisely because such coverage shifts the cost
away from the wrongdoer, thus mitigating the retributive purpose of punitive damages. See
LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIvE DAMAGES § 17.2(B), (C) 227-239 (4th
ed. 2000). There are often some exceptions to the no-coverage rule, even in the states
prohibiting punitive damages protection. See id. However, as is discussed in several places in
this article, there are still punitive elements in tort cases, even if no punitive damages are
awarded, or if awarded, are paid by an insurance company. The litigation process is itself
designedly unpleasant, and even compensatory damages serve a symbolic retributive function
in sending a message that the plaintiff and the defendant are of equal worth and a more-than-
symbolic function in raising future rates for insurance coverage or leading an insurer simply to
exclude policies written for the defendant.
217. See Hampton, supra note 85, at 1687-89, 1696-97.
218. See id. at 1697.
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Therefore, where no significantly demeaning message is sent by a
wrongdoer's action, tort and other civil compensation schemes are
justified primarily by corrective justice. 219 But where a demeaning
message is sent and a wrongful loss inflicted, compensation can be an
important part of a retributive response, and the civil justice system
may often be better equipped to litigate compensation questions than is
the criminal justice system.220
A very different sort of justification than the tort system's
greater competency for including it in a complete retributive scheme is
this: civil options, especially tort suits, address private retributive
needs while criminal suits address public retributive impulses.
221
Individuals whose value is affronted would, "in a natural setting," seek
to satisfy their retributive instincts "by doing something 'bad' to the
actor ourselves or, if we are not strong enough, with the help of some
of our friends. 222 To avoid anarchy and ensure that these individuals
do not respond disproportionately, however, the state mandates that
courts serve this function instead.223 "In this way, the judicial system
serves the ends of private justice. It allows us to receive the cathartic
release of doing something 'bad' to our wrongdoer, albeit in a
219. See id. at 1662-66.
220. See id. at 1662-66 (explaining tort compensation as part of a retributive scheme);
infra text accompany notes 221-26 (discussing the tort system as being more appropriate than
the criminal justice system for achieving personal, as opposed to public, retribution by forcing
compensation); Cf Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COL. L.
REv. 1193, 1201-03 (1985) (arguing that where the parties can themselves or through
insurance afford to pay damages, tort law is generally a more efficient mechanism of social
control than is the criminal law).
221. This theory follows from Alan Calnan's similar analysis. See CALNAN, supra note
203, at 111-18.
222. See id. at 114.
223. See id. at 114-15. Jean Hampton elaborates on a similar point:
To restore this value, the wrongdoer must be defeated in a way that makes
the relative value of victim and wrongdoer apparent. Yet, ironically, the
victim is often ill suited to deliver the defeat, not only because it will often
be the case that he is unable to deliver it in a way that focuses on what is
morally relevant in assessing worth-namely, their common humanity.
The attractiveness of the state as the agent for accomplishing retribution
(for example, through a jury, a judge, or legislative sanction) is that the
state is--or at least purports to be-an impartial agent of morality, with
greater capacity to recognize the moral facts than any involved individual
citizen.
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controlled manner with strict limitations. ' 224  Tort suits are entitled,
"Plaintiff versus Defendant," not, as in criminal cases, "The People
versus Defendant," precisely to make the personal nature of this
conflict clear. Leading tort theorist Alan Calnan makes this point by
asking us to imagine that an offender, "A," fraudulently induces his
victim, "B," to trade valuable gold coins for fake pearls. It might at
first blush be argued, notes Calnan, that justice would be served by the
state's both punishing A in one proceeding and providing B with
compensation from a general state fund for B's lOSS. 225 Yet, Calnan
suggests, such an approach would leave B feeling that justice was not
served:
There is something very sterile and impersonal in such
a scheme of rectification. It may correct the imbalance
in accordance with an arithmetic proportion, but it
might seem strangely unsatisfying to B nevertheless. B
never has an opportunity to return the inconvenience
and embarrassment thrust upon him by A. Nor will A
see the injurious fruits of his mischief. While B has
been made whole by the monetary award, has he been
given his due?
226
A can be given his "due," Calnan suggests, only by fostering B's sense
that he has personally wreaked retribution upon A. That personal
sense is fostered, Calnan suggests, by the tort system.
227
224. CALNAN, supra note 203, at 114.
225. See id. at 111 (articulating this example and its analysis).
226. Id. at 111. Jean Hampton notes that retributive responses need not necessarily
involve any legal liability. See Hampton, supra note 85, at 1696-98. Thus she sees an
apology combined with "making it up" to our victim by amends as retributive in nature. See
id. at 1697-98. "An apology is a way of humbling ourselves in front of the one whose value
(and entitlements) we have failed to respect." Id. at 1698. The apology denies the
diminishing message of the offender's conduct while the amends "attempt to repair the
damage we have done by failing to respect their entitlements." Id. at 1698. Hampton
suggests, however, that this is a small-scale response appropriate only for small-scale
diminishment. See id. at 1697-98. So understood, Professor Abel's stress on apology can be
seen as consistent with my emphasis on retribution via punishment, initially in the tort system,
in more serious cases involving more public injuries, in the criminal justice system.
227. See CALNAN, supra note 203, at 11 1-12, 114-15. Calnan elaborates:
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Criminal litigation, by contrast, addresses injuries to the public
as a whole. Although a wronged individual may feel "resentment,"
observers may instead feel "indignant., 228 "Indignation" is a less
personal sense of retributive anger than the resentment felt by the
injured individual.229 "Indignation is an emotional protest against that
individual's immoral abuse at another's hands, a defense of the values
assailed by the offender., 230 More generally, criminal punishment
promotes social cohesiveness by reaffirming social norms.23'
Professor Abel made a similar point himself in the context of some
To restore the equality between the wrongdoer and the wronged, private
retributive justice seems to require that the wronged party be able to hold
the wrongdoer responsible for her actions. There must be some gesture
which shows that the victim is human, and thus entitled to a minimum of
respect, and that the actor is no more than human, and thus not entitled to
subjugate others. This is a bilateral adjustment, which can only be
effected by and between the parties concerned.... One way of
accomplishing this objective is to force the wrongdoer to give something
of value to the victim.... In our civil judicial system, the wrongdoer
usually must pay compensation to the victim for the loss she has sustained.
This remedy has two consequences. It provides a symbolic gesture of the
restoration of the moral equality between the parties. In turn, it helps to
disgorge from the wrongdoer any gain from her act, and rectify any harm
sustained by the victim.
Id. at 114-15. Cf Vidmar, supra note 49, at 41 ("The most satisfying form of revenge occurs
when the offender is aware of why and who is administering the retaliatory punishment.").
228. See Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 23, at 60. The term "indignation" can also
refer to an individual's response to a wrong where that individual's sense of self-worth is
unaffected by the wrong done. See id. But this latter sense of the term is unimportant for my
purposes. See generally MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 88.
229. See Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 23, at 60.
230. Id.
231. See Vidmar, supra note 49, at 42-43:
An offense is a threat to community consensus about the correctness-that
is, the moral nature-of the rule and hence the values that bind social
groups together. In this sense the offense makes the social group or
community a victim. Hostility toward the offender can thus arise from
"belongingness" in the group independent of empathy toward the specific
victim or of internalized feelings about a social contract.... This
perspective about the threat of an offense to group or community values
also draws attention to the fact that punishment can serve the goal not only
of attempting to change the beliefs or status of the offender but also of
reestablishing consensus about the moral nature of the rule among
members of the relevant social community....
Viewed from this perspective, "disinterested" retributive justice is not disinterested at all: The
response of the individual is based on identification with her or his group and the threat to
values held by that group.
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racially subordinating expression: "By officially proclaiming
transgression of our weightiest norms, criminal accusations and
convictions can profoundly influence racial status. 232  Criminal
punishment thus serves public retributive justice, civil law private
retributive justice.
The need for tort remedies (if any legal remedies are justified
at all) as part of a retributive response to group-subordinating speech
seems especially clear. In arguing for a tort remedy for racial insults,
for example, Richard Delgado catalogues a wide variety of
compensable harms. 233  Racial slurs can cause long-term emotional
pain; can lead its victims to believe in their own inferiority,
consequently limiting their ability to make informed life choices; and
can engender either racial hostility or passive endurance of pain.234
Sufficient emotional pain can lead to mental disease and physical
ailments as well, including high blood pressure and stroke.235 Most
importantly, group subordinating racially insulting speech by
definition harms the dignitary interest in recognition of one's equal
moral worth with other persons.236 Yet that injury is precisely the kind
that calls forth a retributive response.
23 7
Indeed, even group defamation expressed in a written text,
rather than via a face-to-face insult, can inflict a similar sort of injury:
Merely publishing a work proclaiming that, say, men
are better than women, or whites are better than blacks,
is to deny value and thereby do something morally
offensive, but unless other people respond to the book
232. ABEL, SPEAKING RESPECT, supra note 3, at 97.
233. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?, supra note 106, at 8-10.
234. See id.; Cf WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 50, at 24-26 (cataloguing ill effects of
racist hate messages generally rather than only in the specific form of racial insults); DEBRA
VAN AUSDALE & JOE R. FEAGIN, THE FIRST R, How CHILDREN LEARN RACE AND RACISM
(2001) (similar arguments but focusing on the impact on children).
235. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?, supra note 106, at 8-10;
WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 50, at 24-26. Cf THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note 106
(discussing more general harms of racist messages).
236. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?, supra note 106, at 8-10, 20
(noting that existing torts already protect other kinds of dignitary interests).
237. See e.g., Vidmar, supra note 49, at 42 ("Social injuries may evoke stronger reactions
than physical or economic injuries. Social injuries, that is, insults to oneself or one's family or
membership group, speak to the very core of selfhood.").
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in some way, that damage is negligible and society does
not bother to respond. If people take them seriously
and come to believe these assertions of superiority, the
books become much more dangerous, because such
beliefs can prompt people to interfere with the
entitlements of these "inferiors" (to the point of inciting
violent acts against them), and to propagate the view
that they are not valuable enough to be accorded these
entitlements. In a way, such books morally injure not
one individual, but a whole class of individuals, leaving
them sitting ducks for treatment lower (perhaps much
lower) than that which they deserve.238
This argument recognizes that the mere uttering of group-
subordinating speech constitutes a moral injury. The size of that moral
injury turns on whether the words are believed by others, lowering the
victims' social esteem in the eyes of the broader community and, in
turn, leading that community to deny the victims other goods to which
they are entitled as equal persons.239 Much of the debate about
whether the law should regulate group defamation turns precisely on a
disagreement over the extent of the resulting moral and other injuries.
Opponents of regulation argue that speech harms are de minimis,
easily dissipated by counter-speech that points out the defamers'
24024
errors. Proponents argue the opposite. Opponents also worry
about deterring free debate where a speaker's words are perceived as
offensive although not so intended.2 2 Delgado's specific proposal
concerning a tort for racial insults avoids this last problem because it is
limited to intended harms.243
Hostile environment sexual harassment rules arguably do not
so neatly fit this scheme for dividing responsibilities between the civil
238. Hampton, supra note 85, at 1679.
239. Cf Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On
Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 747 (2001) (explaining nature of
devaluation and stereotyping as moral/political injuries).
240. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?, supra note 106, at 101-04,
115-16.
241. Seeidat 101-04, 115-16.
242. Seeidat118-19.
243. See id at 25-26.
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and criminal justice systems. Many different justifications have been
offered for prohibiting workplace speech -that creates a hostile
environment for women workers based upon their gender. 244  Anita
Superson's justification fits the scheme proposed here well: such
sexual harassment expresses the attitude that a particular woman and
members of her sex are, because of their sex, inferior to men.245
Superson emphasizes, however, that the resulting dignitary harm is
inflicted not only on the female victim, but on all women as a group.
246
By reinforcing sexist attitudes that women are inferior to men,
sexually harassing workplace speech affects the status of all women
and the likelihood that their career options will be limited by
stereotypical sex roles. 247 If it is true that a group injury is involved-
and not only injuries to an individual or to society as a whole-then
civil law must account for the group harm, including the group's
retributive needs.248 Group needs, suggests Superson and most other
egalitarian writers on the subject, are best addressed through statutory
discrimination law, not the tort system, because discrimination law
exists to ensure equal opportunity regardless of sex, race, national
origin, or other culturally salient group memberships.249 Tort law is
244. For a recent summary, see CROUCH, supra note 199, at 141-74.
245. See id. at 147-54. (summarizing Superson's views). I am not suggesting that
Superson's views explain all features of the current regulatory scheme. They do not. See id.
at 147-53. Nor do I suggest that her theory has no flaws. It does. But all the various theories
have their strengths and weaknesses and are best understood as reflecting different aspects of
reality. See id. at 174-75. Each of the theories could be explained in a way that connects them
to my arguments here, but Superson's approach is the best fit. Moreover, I note that I am
discussing only "hostile environment," not "quid pro quo," sexual harassment. See
GWENDOLYN MINK, HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: THE POLITICAL BETRAYAL OF SEXUALLY
HARASSED WOMEN 49-51, 61-63 (2000) (quid pro quo framework applies to an implied or
explicit demand for sexual favors to retrain, or advance in a job, but in "a hostile environment
situation, the loss suffered by a target of sexual harassment is the quality of the workplace").
For Superson's detailed explanation of her views, see Anita M. Superson, A Feminist
Definition of Sexual Harassment, 24 J. SOC. PHIL. 46-64 (1993).
246. See CROUCH, supra note 199, at 147.
247. See id. at 148.
248. Superson does not address retributive needs but rather only the group nature of the
injury. See id. at 147-53. However, I have argued here, and elsewhere in more detail, see
Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 746-65, that group-subordinating speech elicits
retributive emotions in both the individual to whom the speech is directed and in the salient
social group to which he belongs.
249. See CROUCH, supra note 199, at 176-86.
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the wrong approach, many of these theorists contend, precisely
because it generally portrays harms as being suffered by individuals.
250
The current federal statutory scheme for regulating sexual
harassment indeed adopts, in part, the statutory discrimination model,
seemingly recognizing the group nature of part of the injury.251' There
are also practical advantages to the current scheme: administrative
remedies are pursued first, and, if those fail, the government may
choose to file suit.252  In both instances, the government pays the
litigation costs, which an individual may not be able to do on her
own.253  The administrative scheme, unlike ordinary tort law, also
provides mechanisms to preserve confidentiality and protect against
retaliation. 254  Yet precisely because the government often takes the
lead role, current law may seem inadequate in taking account of
private, individual dignitary harms.
The current scheme has other features, however, that do
significantly address individual retributive needs. The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 amended Title VII-the statutory authority for sexual
harassment regulations-to permit the plaintiff to seek compensatory
or punitive damages within certain narrow limits. 2 55 Previously, Title
VII remedies were limited to equitable relief such as back pay, an
256injunction against future harassing conduct, or reinstatement.
Moreover, now a plaintiff seeking compensatory or punitive damages
can demand a jury trial, as can the employer. 257 Furthermore, it has
250. Id. at 177-78; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 141 (1987). Similar points about the group nature
of part of the injury inflicted by harmful speech can be made where it is directed at racial,
ethnic, religious, or other salient groups, not only speech directed against women. See Taslitz,
Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 746-65.
251. See CROUCH, supra note 199, at 37-84, 176 (explaining nature of legal definition of
sexual harassment and its current legal conception as primarily a matter of discrimination law
rather than tort law).
252. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)(1994) ("If the Commission determines after [an
investigation filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved) that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate
any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion.").
253. See CROUCH, supra note 199, at 183-84.
254. Id. at 183-84.
255. See id. at 63, 179.
256. See id. at 63.
257. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1)(1994)("If a complaining
party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this section, any party may demand a
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long been true under Title VII that if the government refuses to pursue
a case or fails to act in a timely manner, the plaintiff can turn to the
courts for statutory relief on her own.258  All these features-most
clearly the availability of punitive damages-seem consistent with
satisfying individual retributive needs.259 Complete satisfaction,
however, is unlikely. Only the employer, not the harassing individual
himself, can be held liable.260 An employee facing an employer
trial by jury"); West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 216 (1999) (stating the Compensatory Damages
Amendment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides that-any party may demand a trial by
jury).
258. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(1994) ("If a charge filed with the Commission ... is
dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such
charge or the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section ... the Commission ...
shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a
civil action may be brought against the respondent...."); Scott v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
No. CIV.A.00-2090, 2000 WL 110787, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2000). "In circumstances
where the EEOC has failed to issue [the right to sue letter] despite the expiration of the 180-
day deadline, however, courts have allowed a plaintiff to proceed so long as she can show she
is entitled to the right to sue letter and has requested it." Dollinger v. State Ins. Fund, 44 F.
Supp.2d 467, 474 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that in order to waive or toll the statutory
requirement to procure a right to sue letter before filing suit, a plaintiff must show that an
effort was made to procure the right to sue letter or that he raised the failure to issue a right to
sue letter or that he raised the failure to issue a right to sue letter with the EEOC prior to filing
the action).
259. Punitive damages are readily understood as having a retributive justification. See
Hampton, supra note 85, at 1687-89; MARC GALANTER & DAVID LUBVAN, POETIC JUSTICE:
LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS (1999).
260. See CROUCH, supra note 199, at 180. Crouch argues that holding only the employer
liable makes sense if sexual harassment is conceived of as a group injury. "Employers are
charged with maintaining nondiscriminatory environments for their employees. If an
employee is discriminating against someone, the employer has the responsibility to stop it."
Id. at 180. Crouch continues:
However, if one conceives of sexual harassment not as group based, but in
terms of individuals, this is likely to seem wrongheaded. The person who
performed the harmful act-and especially, the person who benefited from
the act-should be held responsible, should pay for the harm; and the
person who performed the harmful act and benefited from it is the
harasser. The employer might be seen to have harmed the victim in an
extenuated way-by not protecting the victim from the harasser- but the
employer does not benefit from the harassment.
Id. at 180 (emphasis in original). Crouch's emphasis on "making the harasser pay," and
Crouch's language of "responsibility" rather than "liability," are suggestive of retributive
desires directed against the harasser, though Crouch does not make this point explicitly.
Unlike Crouch, I do not see the choice as a dichotomous one between group and individual
injuries. Sexual harassment causes both sorts of harms. The desire for vengeance would stem
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indifferent to its supervisors' harassing conduct could reasonably feel
a need for vengeance against the employer. 261 The victim's retributive
anger is also likely to be directed against the individual supervisor or
co-worker who harassed her. The statute does not address that need.
Moreover, the statutory limits on the amount of compensatory and
punitive damages may in some cases be inadequate to nullify the
dignitary harm that the harasser inflicted on his victim. 262  A tort
remedy for exceptional cases might thus be a wise addition to the
current statutory remedies, as some theorists have proposed, albeit on
different grounds.
263
from her perception of the employer's cruel indifference to her plight as demonstrating the
employer's evil nature. See Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 23, at 53-55 (characterizing
indifference as evil). Additionally, groups can themselves feel retributive needs when one of
their members is harmed because of her membership in the group. See Taslitz, Racist
Personality, supra note 23, at 758-62. When the individual is vindicated, so is his group. But
that a group is harmed does not automatically convert a private injury into a public one,
meriting criminal, rather than civil punishment. See infra text accompanying notes 335-53.
261. The desire for vengeance would stem from her perception of the employers' cruel
indifference to her plight as demonstrating the employers' evil nature. See Taslitz, Two
Concepts, supra note 23, at 53-55, 58-64 (portraying indifference as evil). The statute, of
course, does not limit protection only to female victims, but their plight instigated the
legislation, so I thus choose female victims for my examples. See CROUCH, supra note 199, at
25-36, 67-69, 200-06. Various statutory and regulatory provisions also address other kinds of
harassment, including those based on race, sex, religion, national origin, age, and disability.
See id. at 206-20.
262. See CROUCH, supra note 199, at 63, 179. On the other hand, one commentator has
noted that the 1991 amendments making compensatory and punitive damages available for
intentional discrimination, "Fundamentally changes the legal model underlying federal
discrimination laws. The new Act, in providing for expanded money damages, moves these
causes of action away from a format in which the goal is conciliation and improvement of
employer-employee relations and toward the more adversarial format of a civil trial for tort
damages." Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of
the "Reasonable Woman " Standard in Sexual Harassment Claims, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 785,
n.62 (1993).
263. See CROUCH, supra note 199, at 178-86. Ellen Franklin Paul favors reliance solely
on a tort remedy for numerous reasons, most importantly that she sees sexual harassment as a
purely individual rather than a group injury, contrary to my suggestion that it is often both.
See Ellen Franklin Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 2
YALE L & POL'Y REv. 333, 349 (1990). See also Ellen Franklin Paul, Bared Buttocks and
Federal Cases, 28 SOCIETY 4-7 (1991); CROUCH, supra note 199 at 179-83 (analyzing Paul's
work). Others, such as Michael Vhay, argue for a tort remedy in addition to the statutory one.
See e.g., Michael Vhay, The Harms of Asking: Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual
Harassment, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 328 (1988); CROUCH, supra note 199, at 178-86 (surveying
remedy approaches). None of the advocates for an exclusive or supplementary tort remedy,
however, make administering retribution central to their theories. See, CROUCH, supra note
199, at 178-86. Nor is retribution articulated by courts and commentators as one important
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The discussion so far establishes retributive reasons for
providing both tort and criminal remedies for harmful speech.
Criminal remedies for group defamation and for sexual harassment
have indeed been proposed by some thinkers. 264  Hate crimes
legislation as well criminalizes certain sorts of group-subordinating
expression.265  Yet most current legal practice and proposed legal
reforms turn exclusively to the civil justice system.266 Why?
There are at least five answers to this question, and each of
these answers helps to identify additional strengths and weaknesses of
legal regulation as a mechanism for addressing harmful speech.
1. The Difficulty of Crafting Criminal Punishment That Does
Not Degrade the Offender
Remember that retributive punishment must "defeat" the
offender without degrading him.267 Rephrased, punishment must send
the message that the offender and his victim are of equal human
worth.268 Excessive punishment of the offender instead degrades him,
sending the message that he is of less worth than his victim. Yet it is
often hard to craft non-degrading criminal punishments.
269
Part of the difficulty arises because society's members often
view a criminal wrongdoer as himself evil. They wish to denounce not
merely the offender's act but the offender himself, seeing his essential
character as tainted.27 ° Indeed, some theorists have argued that,
"Punishment disavows the offensive act because the status degradation
justification for the current regime. See id. at 178-86. I argue that the current regime is, in its
broad outline, consistent with a retributive justification, though alternative regimes can be
conceived that would even better fit a retributive model. Any legislation must also serve a
variety of objectives, and that may mean designing a scheme that is not ideal for serving any
one goal (such as retribution) but that serves multiple competing goals tolerably well.
264. See Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2230, 2380
(1989); Carrie N. Baker, Sexual Extortion: Criminalizing Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment,
13 LAW AND EQUALITY J. 213 (1994).
265. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 758-65.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 199-201.
267. See Hampton, supra note 85, at 1690-91.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See, e.g., Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 742-45, 754-58; Taslitz, Two
Concepts, supra note 23, at 48-64.
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that accompanies punishment defines the offender as outside the
group."
271
These reactions are not necessarily bad ones. Indeed, I have
argued elsewhere that character morality should play an important role
in the criminal law. 272 The exclusion of the offender from being a full
member of the moral-political community (literal exclusion as well, in
the case of imprisonment) has a powerful impact in reaffirming social
norms.273  Furthermore, such exclusion and focus on the offender's
evil nature recognizes that while each of us is of equal worth as a
human being, entitled to'rights that recognize that worth, we are not of
equal moral worth, and the immoral part of wrongdoers' natures must
be rejected without denying them status as full human beings.274  In
some sense, the offender must still be seen as an end in himself,
worthy of our respect.
275
Indeed, in the view of some commentators, character morality
may be essential to showing respect for an offender because it assumes
that he can, and should, change.276 Whether punishment, in fact,
produces positive change is subject to dispute, and no global answer
may be possible. 277  For some offenders, suffering may teach them
271. Vidmar, supra note 49, at 37 (analyzing H. Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful
Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. Soc. 420 (1956)). I am not arguing that Professor
Vidmar embraces character morality as the normatively best criterion for imposing criminal
liability. He expresses no opinion on that point. But his observations on the effects of
punishment on status, exclusion, and social norms are consistent with a character morality-
one that judges moral and criminal responsibility based on the nature of one's character as
revealed in her actions. See sources cited supra note 270 (defining character morality).
272. See sources cited supra note 240.
273. See sources cited supra note 20; Vidmar, supra note 49, at 37, 41-43.
274. See Hampton, supra note 88, at 1690-91.
275. See PRIMORATZ, supra note 53, at 79; ROGER J. SULLIVAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO
KANT'S ETHICS 67-71 (1994).
276. See Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 23, at 48-52; Taslitz, Racist Personality,
supra note 23, at 755-58, n.90 (making similar point but also offering justifications for
character morality even when it is assumed that an offender's future character cannot be
changed or even that he lacks free will).
277. See TONRY, supra note 195, at 173 ("The belief that more certain or harsher
penalties will reduce the rates for serious crimes is not supported by evidence on the effects of
recent increases in punishment severity, the scientific literature on deterrence, or research on
the effects of mandatory penalties."); PARENTI, supra note 190, at 163-210 (discussing the
negative effects of incarceration on prisoners); DUFF, supra note 92, at 4:
To identify crime prevention as an aim is not yet to specify punishment as
the, or even a, means by which we should pursue it: since the end is
identified independently of the practice, it is so far an open question, to be
356
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empathy for victims. 278 For other offenders, suffering may deter them
from future crime because they fear punishment but effect no moral
transformation. 279 .Still others may be entirely unmoved by their
punishment or learn simply that it is a cruel world in which each of us
must look out for ourselves. 280 Such offenders may be more depraved
after punishment than before.
281
Wherever the truth lies, these commentators would argue that
punishment treats the offender as free, responsible, and rational.282 To
be free, rational, and responsible is to be human. Punishment
recognizes the offender's power to choose to behave otherwise and his
obligation as an equal citizen to be accountable for his actions to
others. 283 Punishment thus demonstrates respect for offenders even if
it leads to no improvement in their natures.
284
Retributive metaphors also often speak of punishment as
"cleansing pollution." 285  These metaphors are not simple modes of
expression but templates that mold and reflect our thinking about
retributive ideals.28  Punishment is understood both as cleansing the
criminal-as-filth from the community and as purifying the criminal
himself of the polluted part of his nature. 87 The community has an
answered by empirical investigation, whether this practice is an efficient
means to that end.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 94-99 (explaining forced psychological therapy
for sexual assailants by teaching them empathy for, and co-suffering with, their victims).
279. This deterrence theory is clearly articulated in early law and economics analyses of
the criminal law. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 220, at 1193; Jeffrey L. Harrison, Repentance,
Redemption and Transformation in the Context of Economic and Civil Rights, in Civic
REPENTANCE 3, 21 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1999). ("A person who has been conditioned to change
his or her behavior may be rehabilitated but not have repented in the sense of having
undergone a moral transformation").
280. See PARENTI, supra note 190, at 163-210 (noting lessons in cruelty taught in
prisons); TONRY, supra note 195, at 173 (arguing severe punishment often does not deter
future crimes); GARY LAFREE, LOSING LEGITIMACY: STREET CRIME AND THE DECLINE OF
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA 155 (1998) ("Punishment is less likely to have an impact on
the future behavior of ... the punished offender ... in societies in which political and legal
institutions have little legitimacy.").
281. See sources cited supra note 280.
282. See PRIMORATZ, supra note 98, at 79.
283. See id. at 790-80.
284. Id.
285. Solomon, supra note 32, at 141.
286. Id. at 140.
287. Id. at 141.
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288obligation to reinforce its moral norms by punishing violators. The
community's failure to punish offenders leaves the community tainted.
Punishing the offender does more than wash away this community
stain; it also ritually cleanses the criminal in a way that sets the stage
for (even if it is not alone sufficient for) his rejoining the
community.289 Thus "rehabilitation"-which, remember, should be
part of any sound retributive response-"refers not so much to the
alteration of a personality as to the reinstatement of a person to his pre-
criminal status, the restoration of rights and privileges as a (no longer
polluted) citizen., 290  Suffering has similarly long been viewed in
Western religions and in American legal culture as a necessary, but not
sufficient, step toward redemption.29' That suffering must be followed
respectively by submission to God's law (in the religious tradition) or
to the fundamental law constituting our Nation (in our political
tradition).292 But such submission is possible only when suffering has
cleansed our natures of the stain of our indulgence in evil. 293  Law
professor George Fletcher explains the link between American notions
of political and religious suffering this way:
288. See supra text accompanying notes 232-33; infra text accompanying notes 291-303.
Relying on the Bible as authority for this ancient concept, one commentator noted:
[Tihe community is required to see that the commands are enforced and
that violations are punished. If for any reason the individual is not held
accountable for his or her crime, the entire community becomes guilty.
This is what happened in the Book of Joshua, when Achan's unpunished
crime caused the Israelite Army's defeat at Ai ... This is also why the
entire Israelite community must seek out and execute Sabbath violators,
blasphemers, and seriously disobedient and rebellious children ... By
failing to do so, they became accomplices with the criminals and equally
guilty with them.
DAVID NOEL FREEDMAN, THE NINE COMMANDMENTS: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN PATTERN OF
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE HEBREW BIBLE 117-18 (2000).
I am not suggesting that I or Noel Freedman believe that an individual's suffering is
deserved as a sign of God's anger for the violation of Divine Law, a position that would be
inconsistent with my defense of human imposed retributive punishment. The suffering that
most of us face at one time or another in our lives is often simply the result of bad luck.
Freedman's point is simply that the Bible can be read as teaching the lesson that the whole
community is harmed by crime and obligated to punish the offender as a prerequisite to
effective community healing.
289. See Solomon, supra note 32, at 141; FREEDMAN, supra note 288, at 117-18.
290. Solomon, supra note 32, at 141.
291. See FLETCHER, supra note 142, at 18-34.
292. Id.
293. Id.; Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 23, at 48-64 (portraying punishment as
retribution against evil).
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There are some strains in the Jewish tradition that link
the letting of blood with returning the soul to God....
The connection between blood and salvation becomes
much stronger, however, in the Christian interpretation
of its Jewish legacy. The theme of blood spilling from
the body becomes powerful in the crucifixion and
reaches its apotheosis in the faith that a great battle, an
Apocalypse, must precede the Second Coming of the
Messiah. The spilling of blood in a great battle is
understood instinctively as the suffering that must
precede redemption. As John Brown was led to the
gallows on the eve of the Civil War, having
unsuccessfully sought to stimulate a slave revolt, he
handed one of his guards a note, "I John Brown am now
quite certain that the crimes of this guilty land will
never be purged away but with blood.,
294
Fletcher's sentiment here can be understood in expressive
retributivist terms as follows: imposing suffering on an offender
adequate to expunge his message of domination over his victim
restores them both as equal persons. Only then is the community safe
to re-embrace the offender because only then are he and his law-
abiding fellows redeemed in a community of equals. Fletcher's
reference to the Civil War can thus be seen as saying that the massive
hundreds of years long diminishment of African-Americans by white
Southern slaveholders and their white Northern accomplices required
294. FLETCHER, supra note 142, at 19. This is, of course, Fletcher's reading of the Jewish
and Christian traditions as he believes they are popularly understood in America and not
necessarily the official teaching of any particular Jewish or Christian sect. See, e.g.,
CHRISTIANITY IN JEWISH TERMS 203-38 (Tikva Fryner Kensky, et al. eds., 2000) (analyzing the
complexity of Jewish and Christian theological views on the significance of suffering).
Nevertheless, other well-known academics in various fields have echoed sentiments similar to
Fletcher's. See Solomon, supra note 32, at 141 (discussing Christian conception of suffering
as cleansing); ANDREW DELBANCO, THE DEATH OF SATAN: How AMERICANS HAVE LOST THE
SENSE OF EVIL 125-35 (1995) (describing Abraham Lincoln as viewing the Civil War as
cleansing the evil of a tragic South and a complicitous North, though Lincoln was not vengeful
by disposition).
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those offenders' suffering to be equally grave, thereby renouncing the
false message of Black inferiority and cleansing the Nation's soul. 295
This focus on redemption from suffering can also be expressed
in other secular terms consistent with a liberal society. One notion of
liberalism is "perfectionist liberalism," derived from the work of legal
philosopher Joseph Raz. 296  Raz believes that fostering human
autonomy, a central goal of a liberal state, requires creating a certain
kind of moral community.297  The criminal law can be one among
other useful devices in creating such a community. While perhaps not
so conceived by Raz, his theory is reminiscent of Civil War republican
ideals of promoting a citizenry of virtuous character. Such ideals are
arguably embodied in the Reconstruction Amendments to the federal
Constitution.298 "Republicanism" in the American story is in the view
295. See supra sources cited note 288, 291, 294. Robert Solomon reminds us, however,
that criminal punishment is sometimes the least effective way to achieve retribution, properly
understood. See Solomon supra note 32, at 142. Retribution is guided by the metaphors of
debt, balance, and cleansing community. See id. at 140-43. All three imply ideas of
relationship among the victim, the offender, and the avenger. See id at 143. Debts can be
repaid in various ways, balance requires being "tuned in" to another, and blood can be seen as
adding to existing bloody pollution. See id. Punishment is not always the best way to rebuild
relationships, cleanse taint, and reach balance, though "punishment is necessary if society is to
endure." Id.
296. See Jean Hampton, Retribution and the Liberal State, 1994 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 117, 141-42 (defining "perfectionist liberalism"); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM (1986).
297. See Hampton, supra note 296, at 141-42.
298. Compare Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 765-85 (noting the
Reconstruction Amendments' embrace of a virtuous character morality); Andrew E. Taslitz,
Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of Mutual Indifference, 80 B. U. L. REV. 1282
(2000) (arguing that the post-Reconstruction Constitution condemns a citizenry indifferent to
certain forms of extreme physical, psychological, and economic human suffering) [hereinafter
Mutual Indifference]; Taslitz, Slaves No More, The Implications of the Informed Citizen Ideal
for Discovery Before Fourth Amendment Suppression Hearings, 15 GA. ST. L. REV. 709, 719-
34 (1999) (arguing that the post-Reconstruction Constitution's Bill of Rights is designed to
promote an informed, active citizenry) [hereinafter Slaves No More!] with Hampton, supra
note 296, at 142:
Still, there are some who worry that perfectionist liberalism may not really
qualify as liberalism given the way in which it licenses that state to
concern itself in such a thorough-going manner with the choices of its
citizenry. Accordingly, the ease with which this conception of liberalism
accommodates retributive punishment by the state may be thought by
some to show the extent to which this conception of the state has anti-
liberal components. I cannot pursue these worries here, except to say that
there is little point to quarreling over whether or not this view is really a
form of liberalism if, in fact, it happens to be the right view of the state!
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of many scholars not distinct from "liberalism;" rather, the two are
best understood as fused to create a distinctive American political
culture.2 9 9 Persons who seek to diminish others by racial insults, sexist
intimidation, or other forms of group-subordinating speech seek to
limit the autonomy of their victims and to undermine the core
American commitment to equal respect. 300  Such offenders are,
therefore, seen not as good souls engaging in misguided racially-
insulting acts but as "racists," persons whose character is itself in part
morally evil.30 1 To impose suffering on them in the hope of changing
their nature, thus redeeming their "souls," is to respect them as rational
and worthy beings who are capable of, and whom we must strive
toward, rejoining the community of virtuous citizens. 30 2 But even if
punishment fails to make the offender more virtuous, his suffering
solidifies political society's wider commitment to just social norms,
instilling important anti-subordination values in much of the rest of the
citizenry.
30 3
The danger, however, is that the very punishment that
denounces offenders' immoral character may foster a sense that they
And given its commitment to autonomy, it (arguably) includes the most
important liberal idea--one that is also deeply connected to the retributive
justification of punishment.
299. See, e.g., Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 766, n.157 ("While
republican ideals are often said to have been quickly eclipsed by liberal ones-which value
individual autonomy over collective need -- many view citizens of the early republic as having
attempted an uneasy fusion of liberal and republican thinking"); EARL J. HESS, LIBERTY,
VIRTUE, AND PROGRESS: NORTHERNERS AND THEIR WAR FOR THE UNION vii - x (2d ed. 1997)
(arguing that republican rhetoric played a critical motivating role for both Northerners and
southerners immediately before, during, and immediately after the Civil War).
300. Cf Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 58-65 (cataloguing ways in which
hate crimes limit their victims' life options).
301. See id. at 755.
302. See Hampton, supra note 296, at 141 ("Most supporters of retribution, myself
included, see it as a response that respects the autonomy of the law-breaker...."). Even if
there is no free will, analogous arguments for an expressive character retributivism can be
made. See Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 23, at 10.
303. See Taslitz, Racist Personality supra note 23, 765-77 (noting the punishment of hate
crimes offenders reaffirms social norms of equal respect); Vidmar, supra note 49, at 49
(criminal punishment generally helps to reaffirm social norms). See generally, PETER
BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING OF LIBERALISM (1999) (arguing that even such classical
liberal thinkers as Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Mill recognized that a society based on the
presumption of the equal dignity of all persons requires a virtuous citizenry).
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are outside the human community, that they are "monstrous. '" 30 4
Monsters are neither capable of nor worthy of redemption. 30 5 Nor are
they in any sense of "equal" human worth. Accordingly, there are
few, if any, emotional and political obstacles to degrading monsters. 30
6
The demonization of criminals is especially likely now because of
recent changes in American society. Increasing diversity of racial,
ethnic, religious, and political groups and radical economic and social
changes threaten Americans' sense of themselves as a common people
with shared values. 30 7  Criminal punishment therefore acquires a
greater urgency as a means for affirming the values that we do
share. 30 8 Punishment promotes social solidarity. 3°9 But our strongest
values are revealed when we fully understand the motives and
circumstances surrounding the offender's crime. As discussed earlier
in this article, a commitment to equal human worth requires this sort of
in-depth inquiry into an offender's circumstances, motive, and
character to determine whether his actions are fully culpable.
3 10
In addition, there are powerful social pressures against
individualized culpability assessments. 311 Such assessments may, for
example, uncover conscious or unconscious racial bias in legislation,
law enforcement, and prosecution, that many of us do not want to
face.312 Our publicly stated values require us to reject such bias.313
304. See Kennedy, supra note 63, at 829, 858-68 (noting this danger).
305. See id. at 858-68.
306. See id. (detailing psychological mechanisms connecting images of criminal
monstrosity to harsher sentencing).
307. See id. at 865-68.
308. See id. at 868-87. (arguing "moral panics" in the 1980s and 1990s about allegedly
random violence, a crack cocaine epidemic, and child kidnapping and sexual abuse are
connected to fears of social breakdown and lead to harsher prison sentences as a way of
scapegoating a perceived criminal class for causing this social chaos).
309. See id. at 835-48 (relying on the thought of Emile Durkhem); Vidmar, supra note
49, at 46-49 (summarizing empirical work supporting a similar conclusion).
310. See supra text accompanying notes 170-74; Kennedy, supra note 63, at 857.
311. See Kennedy, supra note 63, at 850-55; Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 100, at 14-
24.
312. See Kennedy, supra note 63, at 850-55 (explaining contextual sentencing processes
may reveal the role of racial discrimination in investigating and prosecuting crime or in
causing it); TONRY, supra note 195, at 104-23 (noting increased racial disparities in
incarceration were a foreseeable and likely foreseen consequence of the War on Drugs).
313. See Kennedy, supra note 63, at 850-53 (stating that there is at least "some truth" in
the account of sentencing guidelines creation as a failed but good faith effort to reduce racial
disparities).
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Many commentators argue, however, that middle class whites
privately accept racially disparate law enforcement because it
promotes a sense of white safety and diverts the social cost of more
aggressive police activity away from the white community.
314
A growing fear of crime, often fostered by lawmakers for
political reasons (i.e., to gamer support and win elections) also
encouraged the imposition of ever-higher criminal penalties. 315 Yet a
detailed inquiry into an offender's character and circumstances
generally promotes a sense of mercy that neither politicians nor the
316public wish tugging at their consciences.3! Furthermore, the war on
crime has led to such an overburdened criminal justice system that the
cost of individualized culpability assessments becomes intolerable.
317
There is thus a tension between different expressive purposes:
harsh, standardized punishments to promote the community's sense of
safety and belief in a racially neutral justice system, versus more
individualized assessments that more effectively promote social
solidarity. 318 The tension is resolved if all criminals are portrayed as
monsters. 31 9  In such a case, individualized assessments are
unnecessary because we already know the extent of each offender's
evil nature. 32  Thus we can have such modem phenomena as
sentencing guidelines, which reduce unique individuals to an offense
314. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999) (asserting an extended defense of this argument).
315. See, e.g. WILLIAM J. CHAMBLISS, POWER POLITICS, AND CRIME 1-56 (1999)
(summarizing political advantages of the War on Crime and the techniques used to market it).
316. See Kennedy, supra note 63, at 855-59; COLE, supra note 314.
317. See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 100, at 14-30 (describing assembly-line justice
as the antithesis of individualized justice); CHAMBLISS, supra note 315, at 1-9 (explaining the
massive growth of prisons involved in the criminal justice system in the last few decades);
TONRY, supra note 195, at 81-124 (attributing much of this growth to the Drug War).
318. See Kennedy, supra note 63, at 855-59.
319. See id. at 855-65.
320. See id. at 858. Professor Kennedy wrote further that when harsh punishments are
based on a conception of the crime problem as more serious than it truly is, and when the costs
of punishment fall primarily on minority groups, a sense of solidarity is promoted only among
the white majority. See id. at 859. "The sense of racial division furthered by such punishment
might fuel further anxieties about the degree to which all members of our diverse society truly
share some common moral ground...." Id at 859. The result: Even more severe sentencing
practices in a self-defeating quest for social solidarity. See id.
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severity and prior record score. 32' This resolution of cultural tensions
seeks social solidarity built on a lie, at the price of core tenets of
proportionality and respect for equal human dignity on which
retributive justice rests.
Austin Sarat has argued that these sorts of dangers can be
amplified by aspects of the victims' rights movement.323  That
movement has in some ways blurred the distinction between personal
and public retributive justice, thus also between torts and crimes. 324
Victims seek to feel that they have a more direct, personal role in
defeating the offender. 325 In capital cases, the victims' recounting of
321. See id. at 850-55. See generally KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF
JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998) (analyzing history, the
operation, and impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
322. On how sentencing guidelines in practice impair equal human dignity, Professor
Kennedy notes:
The role of race in criminal sentencing is inherently contestable in the
sense that it is difficult to either prove or disprove whether racial
discrimination is taking place in any given case, contestable because there
is no objective baseline for comparing cases of disparate treatment. A
contextual sentencing process is thereby a contestable sentencing process,
and contestability continues to matter because racial disparities continue to
plague the justice system. A contestable sentencing process is a site for
continued and insoluble controversies about racial justice, and these
controversies exacerbate anxieties about the solidarity of our society.
Solidarity-related concerns about contestability have helped push
sentencing in our society in a more determinate and less contextual
direction....
Kennedy, supra note 63, at 855.
323. See SARAT, supra note 53.
324. See id. at 37 ("It blurs the line between public and private justice, between the
justice of the state acting against those who defy its order and the justice of the victim calling
for vengeance against those who are responsible for private pain and suffering."). Sarat does
not address the tort/crime distinction, but the blurring of that distinction follows from his
objections to the increasing fuzziness of the public justice/private justice distinction.
325. See id. at 43 ("The demand for victims' rights and the insistence that we hear the
voices of victims are just the latest 'style' in which vengeance has disguised itself'). But see
GEORGE FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995)
(arguing that the victims' rights movement merely seeks to protect the dignity of victims in the
same way that criminal procedural rights protect the dignity of offenders). I am not opposed
to all aspects of the Victims' Rights Movement, some of my own writing advocating victims'
rights. See, e.g., TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 26 (1999) (recommending
procedural reforms to ensure that rape victims' stories are heard fairly); Taslitz, Racist
Personality, supra note 23 (stating, in part, a plea for recognition of the full scope of harms
inflicted on the victims of hate crimes). But I am opposed to the movement's excesses and its
failure to consider the potential infringement on suspects' rights stemming from the
movement's reform proposals. See Robert P. Mosteller, Victims'Rights and the United States
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their suffering to juries may especially blur these lines. 326 Relying on
the traditional distinction between personal "vengeance" and
impersonal public "retribution," Sarat labels this phenomenon "the
return of revenge" to the criminal law. 327  He worries, as do others,
that victims are poor at meting out proportionate justice, that passion
will overcome reason.328 Moreover, argues Sarat, "vengeance is the
ultimate measure of loyalty to those who cannot avenge
themselves. ' '329 He continues: "The goal of victims and those who
take up their cause is to repersonalize criminal justice so that the
sentencer has to declare an alliance with either the victim or the
offender. Criminal sentencing thus becomes a test of loyalty." 330 If
the state is seen as loyal to victims only if it sides with their calls for
vengeance, that is a powerful incentive for the sentencer to avoid a
dispassionate calculation of a proportionate punishment.
33
'
Empirical data and experience show that Sarat is not always
correct. Sometimes the state seeks harsher punishment than does the
victim, notably in instances where victims oppose imposition of the
death penalty. Nevertheless, the dangers he identifies are real and
caution against too ready a reliance on criminal punishment. There
may be group-subordinating expressive crimes-violent hate crimes
Constitution: An Effort to Recast the Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO. L.J. 1691 (1997).
Moreover, I here recognize that the risk of victim-oriented reforms serving as a cloak for
excessive vengeance must always be weighed in the balance.
326. See SARAT, supra note 53, at 44-50. Even Professor Fletcher, an advocate of
victims' rights, agrees with this point. See FLETCHER, supra note 325, at 200-01.
327. See SARAT, supra note 53, at 58.
328. See id. at 44-50.
329. See id. at 36.
330. Id. at 41.
331. See id. at 50 ("Revenge is blunted as anger and moral outrage encounter the
impersonal solemnity of public justice. And, just as surely as revenge and retribution clash,
public justice is forced to become less solemn."). As I have mentioned earlier, I do not think
that the personal revenge/public retribution distinction is a sharp one because both stem from
similar emotions. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. Public "retribution" is never
in practice as solemn and impersonal as some courts and theorists pretend. Nor need private
vengeance necessarily be any more disproportionate than public retribution. See BARTON,
supra note 53, at 60-61. Nevertheless, 1 agree that the risk of a disproportionate punishment is
greater where the victims' own desires guide judge's and jury's choices of criminal
punishment.
332. See, e.g., Rick Bragg, On Eve of His Execution, McVeigh 's Legacy Remains Death
and Pain, N.Y. TIMES, at A22 (June 10, 2001) (reporting that some victims of the Oklahoma
City bombing opposed the execution of Timothy McVeigh).
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being a central example-for which only criminal punishment can
bring society close to achieving the proper level of retribution. 333 But
for lesser offenses, aspiring regulators of harmful speech might
justifiably worry that it is better to achieve some measure of
retribution through the tort system than to risk the potential excesses of
criminal justice.
2. The Politics of Grading Retribution
As I noted earlier, different offenses evoke different degrees of
retributive anger. In some instances, the affront to our dignity is de
minimis, not requiring legal intervention at all.334 In other instances,
even where legal intervention is called for, most observers might find
the stigma and potential imprisonment resulting from criminal
punishment too extreme for the offense committed.335 The problem is
that how much retributive anger an offense evokes is partly influenced
by culture, and different cultural subgroups may have different ideas
about what punishment is merited.336 Of course, a desired punishment
may be critiqued as too lenient or too harsh on moral grounds. But as
a practical political matter, cultural conceptions embraced by most
Americans, not some moral theory purportedly independent of culture,
will often prevail.337
It is plausible that many white citizens might recognize that
minority group members may be deeply insulted and angered by
racial, ethnic, or similar insults. But they also may see that injury as
one to individuals or groups but not to the polity as a whole. Restated,
the majority might understand a minority's retributive anger but not
share in it. If so, the majority would see the injuries inflicted by
333. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 746-65.
334. See Hampton, supra note 88, at 1693 (using example of retribution for taking
another's parking space).
335. See id. at 1690. An analogous example in the Fourth Amendment area may help to
make the point. In United States v. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. 1536 (2001), the majority held that an
arrest for the minor traffic violation of driving without a seat belt was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. Although imprisonment is not the ultimate punishment for this offense, I
suspect that most Americans would find custodial arrest for this crime an excessive "penalty"
in itself.
336. See Vidmar, supra note 48, at 44-46.
337. See id.; Hampton, supra note 88, at 1698-1702.
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harmful speech as private, not public, to be appropriately addressed,
therefore, solely by the tort system.
338
At least some members of minority groups may grade the need
for retribution differently than does the majority. Mari Matsuda
notably calls for the use of both tort and criminal law mechanisms to
regulate hate speech, including certain forms of group defamation.
339
She explains her rationale concerning "sterile" or "cold" hate speech-
speech with hateful content but "cunningly devoid of explicit hate
language" 34°-thus:
I am inclined to criminalize the cold-blooded version of
anti-Semitic literature. Given the historical record, this
"cold" version is just as hateful, for all its tone of
distorted rationality, as the "hot" name-calling versions.
To call the Holocaust a myth is to defame the dead, as
Elie Wiesel has so eloquently put it. It is a deep harm
to the living.... The element of hatred and degradation
is present in the monetary conspiracy theory and
holocaust hoax literature. Like the swastika, these texts
take their hateful meaning from their historical context
and connection to violence. To anyone who knows that
context, they cause legitimate distress.
341
Matsuda does not explain why criminal, rather than only civil,
remedies are needed as a response to Holocaust deniers. Current law
and the weight of commentary outside the circle of critical race
theorists would probably oppose any legal regulation of "cold" group
defamation like Holocaust denial.3 42  Part of these commentators'
reasoning is the belief that race, ethnicity, or religion-based group
338. See, e.g., WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 150, at 49 (Professor Matsuda, while
arguing for both tort and criminal remedies, describes only the private injuries suffered by
individual and group victims of hate speech rather than also broader injuries to the polity as a
whole).
339. See id. at 42.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. See, e.g. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 89-
94 (1999) (describing the various views and concluding that current Supreme Court doctrine
precludes "most regulation of racist or other group-directed hate speech...").
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insults are no more offensive or painful than many other kinds of
perceived insults that are necessarily part of "robust" discussion in the
free marketplace of ideas.343 That position in turn suggests that these
thinkers implicitly conceive of the retributive needs generated by hate
speech as de minimis, adequately addressed by emotionally powerful
counter-speech (of course, these thinkers might also entirely deny that
retribution is ever an appropriate justification for speech regulation).344
Matsuda, by contrast, writes with righteous anger about the deeply
hurtful nature of group-subordinating speech, which she characterizes
as a grievous wrong necessitating criminal sanctions as an adequate
retributive remedy.
Another important justification for criminal punishment would
be to articulate the retributive injuries of group defamation as both
private and public. The injury might be conceived as in part to our
nation's deepest political commitment to the value of equality,
meriting a public retributive response in the form of criminal
sanctions. 345 Only such a public response adequately recognizes the
equal status of the insulted groups as fully belonging to the polity.
346
An appeal to higher and more universal values is also more likely to
aid in coalition building, and to inspire citizens outside the insulted
group to action. 3
47
Matsuda's tone, however, can be read by unreceptive readers
as portraying the injury as one to self-interested groups rather than to
wider social and political values: "Tolerance of hate speech," she
343. See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW &
IDENTITY POLITICS 82-84 (1998) (arguing that, even recognizing the insulting messages in hate
crimes, they nevertheless do no more physical or psychological harm, and are no more
culpable, than similar crimes not motivated by hate).
344. See id. at 128-29; DELGADO & STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?, supra note
106, at 95-104 (cataloguing "paternalistic" arguments against hate speech). None of these
paternalistic theorists explicitly address retributive needs, but I say that they "implicitly" do so
because the content and tone of their arguments suggest that minimizing the proper role of
retribution would be their response to my argument here.
345. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 765-85 (making this argument as to
hate crimes).
346. See id. at 758-65.
347. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS (1999) (asserting the political case for legislative supremacy in constitutional rule-
making, including the benefits from interest group debate); GIRARDEAU SPANN, RACE AGAINST
THE COURT (1993) (arguing that political coalition-building is a more promising avenue for
minority rights than the courts).
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explains, "is not tolerance borne by the community at large. Rather, it
is a psychic tax imposed on those least able to pay." 348 Matsuda could
have continued to explain that such a skewed distribution of costs,
when tolerated by the state, sends a message of minority group
inferiority that undermines the central values of our polity-a public
injury appropriate for criminal sanction. 349  She does hint at such a
position but does not state it explicitly.
350
She also notes that the liberty interests of white sympathizers
who wish to hire, marry, adopt, socialize, or jog with people of color
may be harmed by hate speech. But this too can be read by the
unsympathetic as an appeal to two groups' self-interest: "people of
color" and "already sympathetic whites." She shames many other
whites for their guilty "relief that they are not themselves the target of
the racist attack," rendering them unwilling accomplices with the
Klan. 351
In my view, Matsuda is correct about the nature of the group
injuries involved. But an individual or group injury analysis at best
justifies tort regulation. She must further explain the public nature of
the injury, of which many such explanations might be crafted, to
justify criminal sanctions. Furthermore, as a matter of realpolitik, she
must help well-meaning if not-yet-sympathetic whites to empathize
with, rather than simply pity, minority groups' suffering. 352  Telling
stories of individual and group pain, as she does, is one way to
encourage empathy, but that message is undercut by language that too
348. WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 50, at 36. Matsuda feeds this impression by
limiting legal regulation of hate speech to situations where it is directed against a historically
oppressed group. See id. at 36. I express no view on this last point. Nor do I mean to criticize
Matsuda's analysis, much of which I accept. Furthermore, based on the totality of her
writings, I believe that achieving equal respect for all is her professional project. My points
are twofold: first, as a tactical matter, she must more clearly articulate why the injuries of hate
speech should be seen as public, not private, meriting criminal rather than only civil justice
system regulation; second, as a theoretical matter of moral and political theory, she must also
justify why criminal sanctions are appropriate.
349. She does make the point that state tolerance of hate speech sends a message of
exclusion, but again does so by describing the harms of that message as predominantly private
ones. See id. at 25.
350. See Id.
351. Id.
352. See Taslitz, Mutual Indifference, supra note 298, at 1300-03 (explaining how pity is
a distancing emotion, "Poor thing: thank God it can't happen to me!," while empathy brings
people closer).
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easily allows opponents to cast the debate in terms of purportedly
selfish "identity politics." 353 If Matsuda believes that tort regulation is
insufficient absent criminal sanctions, she and her supporters have
more work to do to make her theoretical and practical political case.
3. Freedom of Speech
The need for retribution cannot alone justify legal regulation of
speech. The state has competing moral concerns, among them
protecting the free expression of ideas.354  Many theorists offer
competing justifications for protecting free speech, leading to
differences in whether, or the extent to which, they would protect
group-subordinating expression or even consider it to be "speech"
within the meaning of the First Amendment. 355 The choice of legal
regulation is not necessarily, however, a dichotomous one between
total suppression of harmful expression or the absence of regulation.
A state might conclude that full retribution for such expression
requires criminal punishment. Nevertheless, the state might fear that
criminal punishment creates an unacceptably high risk of deterring
protected speech that the lesser fear of a tortious response would not
create.356 The state's refraining from the full measure of retributive
punishment might also symbolically reflect its recognition that free
speech concerns are involved but do not merit complete protection
because of overriding equality concerns. 357  Alternatively, the state
might conclude that speech regulation must not only be limited in the
nature of the remedy (civil or criminal) but in the time, place, and
manner of the restriction. 358 Sexual harassment laws notably prohibit
353. See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 343, at 10, 130-132 (defining "identity politics"
as when individuals relate to one another solely as members of competing groups who
recognize the strategic advantages of being labeled "disadvantaged" or "victimized"); Taslitz,
Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 780-85 (debunking the view that minority opposition to
hate speech constitutes "identity politics" in the sense that Jacobs and Potter use the term).
354. See Hampton, supra note 85, at 1679, 1694, 1700.
355. See KENT GREENWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, & THE USES OF LANGUAGE 9-71 (1989)
(summarizing these theories).
356. See Hampton, supra note 85, at 1679, 1694, 1700.
357. See id. at 1700.
358. See, e.g., Taslitz & Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the Court, supra note 26, at
781, 824 (1996) (explaining that mere time, place, and manner restrictions should be more
easily justifiable as ways to regulate speech); DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 176-
77 (1998) (noting Court's limited review of time, place, and manner restrictions on speech,
albeit usually where the regulation is content neutral).
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certain forms of sexist speech at the workplace but not elsewhere. 359
Though more controversial, campus hate speech codes limit their
scope to a particular institution, leaving students free within broad
limits to say what they wish in whatever way they wish in other
settings or in their private conversations.
360
4. The Costs of Regulation
Finally, all speech regulation imposes costs on the regulators.
Elected representatives may face a backlash against "political
correctness" among their constituents that will become more intense
where criminal rather than only civil penalties are involved.
3 61
Criminal conduct of any sort is hard to detect. Expanded use of
resources by law enforcement-an increase in police officers and
prosecutors-may be required.362 Overburdened courts could still face
an even larger caseload. In a world of limited resources, regulators
might conclude that the costs of criminal rather than civil regulation do
not outweigh the benefits, though some regulation may be worthwhile.
There is another sort of cost to be taken into account as well.
Legal regulation can help to mold moral and political values.
364
Criminal law, because it is meant to be reserved for the most serious
breaches of social values, plays an especially powerful role in
359. See infra notes 416-34 and accompanying text (summarizing content of federal
sexual harassment laws).
360. See generally, HATE SPEECH ON CAMPUS (Milton Itevmann & Thomas W. Church
eds., 1997). For an insightful alternative view, taking the position that regulation of campus
speech is rarely wise, see MARTIN P. GOLDING, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS (2000).
361. Cf JACOBS & PORTER, supra note 343, at 5, 130-32 (arguing hate crimes legislation
is allegedly divisive, promoting majority backlash).
362. See, e.g., CHAMBLISS, supra note 315, at 50-56 (summarizing massive increase in
resources resulting from harsher policies toward crime). Amy Kaslow, Clinton's Crime Bill
Draws Barbs From Cops and Felons, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, THE U.S., National Section at
3, August 17, 1994 (noting the resources to police and prisons rise as caseloads rise).
363. See Gary Spencer, State's Pending Caseloads Reduced in 1994, N.Y.L.J. May 2,
1995 at 1. (describing overburdened New York courts, with rising caseloads but emphasizing
somewhat successful efforts to reduce back log); Jeff Palmer, Abolishing Plea Bargaining: An
End to the Same Old Song and Dance, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 505, 513 (1999) ("[C]riminal
caseloads commonly doubled from one decade to the next while judicial resources increased
only slightly.") (quoting Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 L. & SoC'Y
REV. 211,236 (1979)).
364. See Taslitz, What Feminism Has To Offer, supra note 122, at 179-87 (discussing
law's "constitutive function").
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changing political morality.365  Austin Sarat has argued that our
administration of the death penalty is an excellent example of how
criminal punishment, improperly conceived, can deeply harm the
American national character:
[S]tate killing contributes to some of the most
dangerous features of contemporary America. Among
them are the substitution of a politics of revenge and
resentment for sustained attention to the social
problems responsible for much violence today; the use
of crime to pit various social groups against one another
and to generate political capital; what has been called
an effort to "govern through crime"; the radicalizing of
danger and, in doing so, the perpetuation of racial fear
and antagonism; the erosion of basic legal protections
and legal values in favor of short-term political
expediency. ... [T]he time may be at hand to condemn
state killing for what it does to, not for, America and
what Americans most cherish. 3
66
Sarat's point seems to be that the retributive satisfaction gained from
the death penalty is outweighed by the harm it does to our national
soul.
Similarly profound and unexpected ill consequences like those
stemming from the imposition of the death penalty are unlikely to
result from regulating group-subordinating speech. Such regulation
sends a message of racial and other group commonality and equal
worth.367 Nevertheless, this regulatory endeavor is a relatively new
one, and we must tread cautiously to avoid creating a national
character increasingly comfortable with the regulation of speech. Such
comfort raises the risk of deterring legitimate modes of expression. If
we do err, better not to do so with the force of the criminal justice
365. See Abel, supra note 1, at 201 (explaining criminal law's expressive function); Sara
Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law or Zeal for Criminal
Enforcement?, 80 B.U.L. REv. 1227, 1254-64 (2000) (summarizing status of research on
whether criminal punishment or the mere adoption of un-enforced criminal laws can shape
cultural values).
366. SARAT, supra note 53, at 30.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 178-85.
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system. Moreover, the criminalization of group-subordinating speech
would add to the over-criminalization of our society generally,
indirectly contributing to the sorts of unwanted changes in national
character that Sarat bemoans as having stemmed from the death
penalty. 368 Tort regulation reduces this risk.
5. Tentative Conclusions
This article has thus far argued, first, that legal regulation of
group-subordinating speech can serve retributive justice in a way that
civil society generally cannot. Second, such regulation is best
undertaken by the civil, rather than the criminal, justice system. These
arguments do not in themselves justify legal regulation, for there can
be contextual countervailing concerns sometimes more important than
satisfying retributive needs. Nevertheless, where legal regulation is
appropriate, it also may have the additional benefit of promoting a
form of respect for others-respect as belonging-that Professor Abel
has ignored. Explaining why this is so is the task of the next section of
this article.
C. Respect As Belonging
Professor Abel defines respect as according persons and groups
369appropriate status.  Status hierarchies always take place, however, in
relationship to or among specified communities.370  A criminal law
professor has a certain status among other criminal law professors, a
clergyman among his congregation, and a soldier among his fellow
368. See supra text accompanying notes 189-99. (discussing over-criminalization); see
also notes 297-353 (noting the connection between law and culture).
369. See Abel, supra note 1, at 201-02.
370. See e.g., Abel, supra note 1, at 229 ("[Status] conflict is especially bitter within
religions" (emphasis in original); ABEL, SPEAKING RESPECT, supra note 3, at 58-124 (detailed
analysis of status conflict among social groups).
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warriors. Status specifies a place or position in a particular community
and thus marks you as belonging to that community.
3 71
Status hierarchies may also take place across groups or
communities. 372  But when this hapens, it assumes ranking in a
broader, superordinate community. 3 73  Lawyers and politicians, for
example have lower status, while medical doctors enjoy higher status
in the broader community of the American people. 374
There is one community, however, that assumes equal status
among all its members: the community of American citizens.375
Whether this assumption is fictional, Americans believe they are each
entitled to certain equal rights and obligations simply by virtue of
being American citizens. Nonetheless, there are many Americans that
do not always believe the same about other citizens. 376 Our modem
notion of citizenship reaches beyond political rights and obligations,
such as the right to vote and the ability to serve in the military, to
rights and obligations on the job, in schools, and in our
neighborhoods.377 When we are treated in the realm of citizenship as
less than full equals with our co-citizens, however, we experience
exclusion from the American polity because that polity is defined by
equal treatment in these areas.378  This exclusion marks us as less
worthy, and thus of lower status, than other Americans.3 79  Like all
371. See infra text accompanying notes 393-93 (stating respect turns on two inter-related
concepts: status and belongingness).
372. See ABEL, SPEAKING RESPECT, supra note 3, at 58-124; cf Vidmar, supra note 49, at
34-37 (arguing punishment partly concerns the relative status of victim and offender in a
larger group).
373. See ABEL, SPEAKING RESPECT, supra note 3, at 58-124.
374. See KENNETH L. KARST, supra note 142, at 1-27 (articulating this point, albeit
emphasizing belonging more than status in the yin-yang of respect).
375. See id. at 58-124.
376. See id. at 1-27.
377. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Slaves No More, supra note 298, at 709, 757-58 (1999)
("Citizens have different rights in their different roles, locations, and activities. Rights govern
what happens in schools, the workplace, the home, environmental protection, higher
education, the professions, and the political process"); See generally MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE
GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE (1998) (stating a more detailed
development of a similar point in connection with his theory of the "monitorial citizen.").
378. See KARST, supra note 142, at 1-27; Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and Justice: The
Fourth Amendment from the Bottom Up (draft) (on file with the author) (summarizing
psychological research on the sense of exclusion); TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note
26 (describing the connection between unequal treatment and exclusion).
379. See KARST, supra note 142, at 26-27.
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other social phenomena, this exclusion can take place at both the
individual and the group level. 380 Both the sense of exclusion and the
resulting loss of status are experienced as disrespect, evoking outrage
among the offended groups. 38' The law has always played an
especially critical role in defining who belongs to the polity and who
does not.382 Professor Kenneth Karst has explained it thusly:
When the instrument for excluding a group is the law,
the hurt is magnified, for the law is seen to embody the
community's values.... When a city segregates the
races on a public beach, the chief harm to the
segregated minority is not that those people are denied
access to a few hundred yards of surf. Jim Crow was
not just a collection of legal disabilities; it was an
officially organized degradation ceremony, repeated
day after day in a hundred ways, in the life of every
black person within the system's reach.383
The chief accomplishment of Brown v. Board of Education,384
therefore, was in rejecting state-sanctioned messages of African-
American exclusion from full and equal participation in the polity.
385
In certain contexts, group-subordinating harmful speech is
understood as assaulting aspects of equal citizenship, though the
speech is generated by private parties rather than by the state.
386
Racist or sexist speech that is harassing or intended to cause harm at a
workplace is seen, for example, as interfering with an equal
opportunity to compete fairly in the job market, an opportunity central
380. See TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 26, at 134-37.
381. See Taslitz, Bottom Up, supra note 378; Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth
Amendment Disrespect: From Elian to the Internment (draft) (on file with the author)
(explaining minority community outrage at unequal treatment by the police).
382. See KARST, supra note 142, at 24-26; KENNETH KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S
EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 1-32
(1993) (describing how law's expressive function affects group status).
383. See KARST, supra note 142, at 20.
384. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
385. See Charles Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech On
Campus, 1990 DUKE L. J. 431 (1990).
386. See id.
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to American citizenship. 387 Mari Matsuda pointed out previously that
when the state ignores such assaults, it is painfully perceived as
sanctioning them, at least in the view of the injured groups. 388  By
contrast, legislation condemning these words that wound sends a
powerful message that the state as the voice of the polity welcomes the
affected groups as equal members of the American community. 389
Legislation also has ancillary benefits. Coalitions must be built
in order to pass legislation, thus promoting inter-group
communication. 390 Working together toward a common goal itself
sends messages of mutual respect. 39' Furthermore, trials pursuant to
statutory compensation schemes provide for the airing of debate and
re-affirmation of positive values in a public forum in much the same
way as does debate in civil society. Legal solutions thus further
respect as belonging in a way that other solutions do not while
contributing to the broader social transformation that Professor Abel
suggests is predominantly the role of civil society. 393
387. See CROUCH, supra note 199, at 25-84, 206-20 (summarizing law, history, and
rationale of federal regulation of sexual and racial workplace harassment); Taslitz, Slaves No
More!, supra note 298, at 757-58 (arguing workplace treatment is central to modem notions of
American citizenship).
388. WORDS THAI WOUND, supra note 50, at 25, 49-50.
389. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?, supra note 106, at 66-68.
390. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A
Call for a Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. LEG., 329, 35-57 (1995)
(summarizing how legislative politics work).
391. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 167-68 (1990)
(discussing the advantages of coalition-building among the oppressed).
392. See TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 26, at 137-41 (making similar point
but for criminal rape trials).
393. Political scientist Iris Marion Young argues that state action via law, rather than an
appeal to civil society, is most often necessary to counter private economic activity, frustrating
the aspect of justice that promotes "self-development"-persons using and expanding
satisfying skills in socially recognized settings in a way that enables them to express their
feelings and perspectives on social life in contexts where others can listen. See IRIS MARION
YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 31-32, 180-88 (2000). But Young is perhaps too
sanguine about the virtues of civil society's adequately promoting another sort of justice,
"self-deternination"-the ability to participate in collective regulation to prevent
"domination," institutional processes limiting autonomy. See id. at 32-33, 180-88. The
project of critical race and feminist theorists writing about hate and demeaning sexist speech
can partly be seen as an effort to establish the ways in which it limits individual, group, and
collective autonomy. See generally DELGADO & STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?, supra
note 106; WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 50; TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 26,
at 137-41.
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D. Market Failure
Professor Abel's faith in civil society also seems to be a variant
of the classical theory that the free marketplace of ideas can cure
systemic social ills.39  More speech, more equally distributed, can
help oppressors to understand the errors of their ways. 395 Though not
all oppressors will change, many will apologize. 396  Others will
credibly persuade their audience of no ill motive, striving to be more
careful of what they say in the future.397 Reason will prevail from this
exchange.
To achieve more speech, Professor Abel urges the oppressed to
come forward in their local face-to-face communities-schools,
workplaces, neighborhoods, voluntary associations, and cultural
venues. 398 Yet he notes that this can work only if the subordinated
recognize the harm, believe things can change, are supported by
collectivities, and are protected from retaliation. 399  "Gossip,
cooperation and obstruction, deference and contempt, inclusion and
ostracism" can then function as informal mechanisms, not to resolve
conflict but to equalize status.40 Moreover, the entire process must be
controlled by the victims in order to empower them.4 °1
This is a tall order to achieve in many instances absent some
measure of state regulation. The very local face-to-face communities
of which Professor Abel speaks are often populated largely by
402
members of dominant communities. Those members may see no
394. See FARBER, supra note 358, at 4-5 (summarizing the "free marketplace of ideas"
rationale for free speech protection).
395. See Abel, supra note 1, at 217-18 (arguing that inter-group conversations allow
speakers to learn sensitivity and to learn how to avoid future offense).
396. See id. (proposing apology as a frequent alternative remedy to legal regulation).
397. See id.
398. See id. at 218.
399. See id. at 217.
400. See id. at 218.
401. See id.
402. Professor Young recognizes that one of the dangers of the turn to civil society is that
it:
may exacerbate problems of inequality, marginalization, and inhibition of
the development of capabilities, for persons and groups with greater
material and organizational resources are liable to maintain and even
enlarge their social advantages through their associational activity.
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wrong to correct, or only pay lip service to doing so. 403  Majority
members often find minority members' complaints to reflect
hypersensitivity.4n 4 Furthermore, free speech ideals prod leaders, if
they do permit complaints to be voiced, to let all sides have their
405
say. They do not always side with the disempowered, preferring
precisely the liberal neutrality that Professor Abel urges them to
jettison. 06 When institutions do side with the subordinated, the kind
of backlash against political correctness sets in that Professor Abel
worries will be caused by legal regulation.40 7
Furthermore, racist and sexist attitudes are hard for many
people to see in themselves, or their views seem to them perfectly
justified by the evidence and thus not racism at all.40 8 For example,
they might point to, evidence of the disproportionate number of black
males in prison to prove that blacks are presumptively more dangerous
than whites.409 Those sorts of attitudes are deeply ingrained, are part
of our sense of self, and thus often remarkably slow to change.
4 1 °
YOUNG, supra note 393, at 186. Young further notes that "an effective way for more powerful
or privileged actors to promote their political interests is to try to control the agenda of public
discussion." Id. at 178.
403. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?, supra note 106, at 83-85.
404. Cf Donald Lively, Reformist Myopia and the Imperative of Progress: Lessons for
the Post-Brown Era, 46 VAND. L. REv. 865, 881 (1993) ("The case for racist speech
management is troubling ... for its lack of perspective ... [Racist hate speech... is a relatively
marginal source of stigmatization and subordination. Reformist fixation on expression
suggests that anger.. .has consumed judgment, clouded vision ... ").
405. Cf Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?,
1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 496 (1990) ("[A]n anti-hate speech policy stultifies the candid inter-
group dialogue concerning racism and other forms of bias that constitutes an essential
precondition for reducing discrimination.").
406. See generally, Henry Louis Gates, Critical Race Theory and Freedom of Speech, in
THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 119 (1996) (defending the pragmatic wisdom of letting
all have their say over the alternative of speech suppression). Abel, supra note 1 at 285
(rejecting liberal neutrality).
407. See SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH (1990); Abel, supra note 1, at 213, 218 (noting
backlash fears).
408. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?, supra note 106, at 83-85;
JODY D. ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA 115-53 (1997).
409. See TONRY, supra note 195, at 49-124 (explaining the disproportionate percentage of
black males in prison as partly a foreseeable result of the drug war); ROBERT M. ENTMAN &
ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA 91
(2000) ("The racial stereotyping of blacks encouraged by the images and implicit comparisons
to whites on local news reduces the latter's empathy and heightens animosity....").
410. See DELGADO& STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?, supra note 106, at 83-87.
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None of these observations mean that the free market in speech
always fails as a remedy. To the contrary, many collectivities in civil
society, especially in schools and workplaces, are making serious
efforts to increase anti-subordinating speech and to raise the likelihood
that captive audiences-students and employees-will be receptive.4 1
But this brings me to my next point: law often sets the stage for
discussions of anti-subordination principles in civil society to be
productive.
E. The Role of Legal Regulation In Aiding Reasoned Debate
In Civil Society
Several years ago, I was required to participate in a role-
playing exercise as part of mandatory sexual harassment prevention
training at Howard University. I was part of a group of three men.
One was supposed to loudly and lewdly ogle a passing woman. The
second was to do so but in a quieter fashion. My role was to chastise
both men and discourage them from similar behavior in the future.
We did the role-play surrounded by a gender-mixed circle of about 20
Howard employees.
Although I did and do consider myself a feminist, I found this
role-play difficult. I had been raised to see open male sexual interest
in women as a mark of manhood. Though I intellectually rejected that
training, it was less easy to do so emotionally. I felt somehow de-
manned to chastise men behaving in such a manner. Though their
behavior made me uncomfortable and though I believe that I myself
would never act in a similar fashion, it was harder still to speak up in a
confident, persuasive way that did not lead to an exchange of insults.
The exercise reminded me of how hard it would be for the woman in
those circumstances to speak at all, much less in a way that would
have had an impact on the oglers.4 12 The anti-harassment trainer made
me repeat the exercise three times until I got it "right," though today I
cannot remember how I finally won her approval. The exercise
411. Professor Abel's entire article can be seen as support for this proposition. See
generally Abel, supra note 1.
412. Cf CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDs (1993); WoRDs THAT WOUND, supra
note 50, at 29 ("[R]acist speech decreases the total amount of speech that reaches the market
by coercively silencing members of those groups who are its targets.").
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prompted a heated but productive discussion among all present. While
no voices were squelched, the trainer made it quite clear that the
institution's position was that both ogling and inaction in the face of it
were unacceptable-precisely the sort of institutional support for the
dominated of which Professor Abel approves. 413  The exercise
prompted similar discussions, seminars, and symposia throughout the
University.
Similar training occurs widely throughout the nation in
schools, corporate headquarters, and government agencies.414 In each
case, liberal neutrality is abandoned with each entity defending
messages of treating women with equal respect rather than primarily as
sources of male sexual titillation. These entities do not do this training
as a selfless act of public moral education. They do the training
because if they fail to do so, the entity administrators fear being
sued.415
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an "unlawful
employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.' '4 16  This language is not limited to
economic or tangible discrimination and expresses a "congressional
intent to 'strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
413. See Abel, supra note 1, at 218.
414. See Douglas McLeod, Civil Rights Liabilities Draw Preventative Measures, ADR,
Bus. INS., June 11, 2001 at 18 ("Public risk managers ... facing a wider array of civil rights
exposure than ever before ... are combating the losses ... with more-aggressive and
sometimes up-to-date versions of long-established practices: employee training...." on sexual
harassment being one important example); Anitha Reddy, A Training Solution That Clicks;
Firms Use Computers To Educate Workers on Harassment, Other Legal Issues, FINANCIAL
SECTION, Aug. 12, 2001 at HOI (discussing firms implementing on-line anti-sexual harassment
training).
415. Ellen McLaughlin & Carol Merchasin, Training Becomes Important Step to Avoid
Liability, NAT. L. J. BIO, January 29, 2001, at Bio ("Training a work force on a company's
anti-discrimination/harassment policy has thus become arguably the most important tool for an
employer that wants to protect itself from Title VII liability and punitive damages."); Dean
Schaner, Sexual Harassment Liability in the Post-Faragher Era; How to Define, Prevent, and
Fight a Claim, TEX. LAW., Feb. 7, 2000, at 35 (counseling employers to "[a]dopt and
implement a comprehensive and effective anti-harassment system to prevent, investigate and
remedy harassment," including "mandatory anti-harassment training for both supervisors and
rank-and-file employees.").
416. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964).
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and women' in employment. 41 7 That spectrum includes creating a
discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment. 41 8  To avoid the
creation of such environments, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission adopted guidelines in 1980 specifying that "sexual
harassment" fits within Title VII's definition of "discrimination.
'
"
41 9
Such harassment includes verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
that has the "purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or create[s] an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment. 42 0  The high Court requires the
discriminatory conduct to be "sufficiently severe or pervasive as to
alter [the conditions of the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working environment.' ' 42 1 These regulations unquestionably reach
much speech, yet the Court has suggested that the regulations pass
First Amendment muster.422
In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass 'n,42 3 the United States
Supreme Court held that an employer may not be vicariously liable for
punitive damages for the discriminatory employment decisions of
managerial agents where those decisions were contrary to the
employer's good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII. The Court's
holding stemmed from its conclusion that Title VII aims "not to
provide redress but to avoid harm. 4 24 Specifically concerning sexual
harassment, the Court noted that "Title VII is designed to encourage
417. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting Los Angeles
Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, n.13 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))).
418. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65.
419. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980) (including sexual harassment as a basis of a Title
VII action).
420. Id. (emphasis added).
421. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1 1th
Cir. 1982)).
422. See Taslitz & Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the Court, supra note 26, at 827, n.
250, 832, n. 279 (summarizing case law); Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 461
(1995) (defending sexual harassment regulations' constitutionality). But see Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992) (arguing
that the regulations raise serious first amendment concerns).
423. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
424. Id. at 530. If the Court means what it says, that may be viewed as an implicit
rejection of my argument that fostering compensation in part to achieve retribution is, as a
policy matter, the best way to justify sexual harassment legislation.
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the creation of anti-harassment policies and effective grievance
mechanisms." 4
25
Similarly, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,426 the Court
held that under Title VII, an employee who refuses the unwelcome and
threatening sexual advances of a supervisor, yet suffers no adverse
tangible job consequences, may recover against the employer without
showing that the employer is negligent or otherwise at fault for the
supervisor's actions. But -the employer may have an affirmative
defense, proven by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually
harassing behavior. The employer would also have to show that the
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided or to otherwise avoid harm. The
Court followed this same rule in the companion case of Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton.427
It is no surprise, therefore, that employers would seek to take
advantage of the benefits of these holdings by developing continuing,
comprehensive, and emotionally powerful educational programs for
their employees. 28 The fear of civil liability has thus prodded
employers to encourage anti-subordinating speech in one important
area of civil society.429
The Title VII example does not mean that legal regulation of
harmful speech necessarily makes sense in other areas. When we
move beyond fora central to modem conceptions of citizenship and
beyond intimidating or harassing speech, the dangers of regulation
impinging on legitimately protected speech may rise. 430  But the
425. Id. at 531.
426. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
427. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
428. See supra notes 414-15 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 414-15 and accompanying text.
430. Regulation of group defamation is one potential illustration. During the ante-bellum
period, for example, Southern slaveholders argued for suppressing abolitionist speech on the
theory that it defamed slaveholders as a group. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, THE
"DARLING PRIVILEGE" 198-99 (2000). That history arguably raises worries that group
defamation laws in particular might be used to suppress precisely the kinds of speech needed
to foster values of equality. See also SAMUEL WALKER, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RIGHTS AND
COMMUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 95-114 (1998) (suggesting that group defamation laws
would have been used against the civil rights movement). My point here is only that
regulating group defamation is a harder case to make than regulating harassing speech or face-
to-face racial insults, though there are difficult and contextual questions raised by all these
382 [VOL. 1:305
THE INADEQUACIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY
example does demonstrate that law can play an important role in
laying the foundation necessary for the "more speech" remedy to
group-subordinating messages to work in civil society.
Indeed, the cumulative effect of civil rights legislation
concerning speech can be to change the atmosphere in civil society to
be more receptive to counter-hegemonic voices. 43 1  As Professor
Charles Lawrence explained several years ago, Brown v. Board of
Education,432  outlawing intentional or de jure state-sanctioned
segregation by race in public ' elementary schools, because of its
inconsistency with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, can be read as primarily
serving to make group-subordinating messages less acceptable in civil
society. Brown, he said,
held that segregated schools were unconstitutional
primarily because of the message segregation
conveys-the message that Black children are an
untouchable caste, unfit to be educated with white
children. Segregation serves its purpose by conveying
an idea. It stamps a badge of inferiority upon Blacks,
and this badge communicates a message to others in the
community, as well as to Blacks wearing the badge,
that is injurious to blacks. Therefore, Brown may be
read as regulating the content of racist speech.433
limits on speech. See KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES,
AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 47-70, 77-98 (1995) (finding all these issues difficult but seeing
workplace regulation as more easily justified than in other fora, group defamation regulation
as unwise but a "close question," and the easiest cases involving primarily an intent to
wound). Persuasive arguments that group defamation liability is good policy unlikely to
infringe more valuable speech have been made as well. See generally, FREEDMAN &
FREEDMAN, supra note 200; THOMAS DAVID JONES, HUMAN RIGHTS: GROUP DEFAMATION,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE LAW OF NATIONS (1998). See also ANDREW KOPPELMAN,
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW & SOCIAL EQUALITY (1996) (arguing approvingly that all
antidiscrimination legislation is an effort to change individual and cultural beliefs as
definitionally necessary to achieving social equality).
431. See generally KOPPELMAN, supra note 430.
432. 343 U.S. 250 (1954).
433. See Lawrence, supra note 150, at 59. My description of Brown as narrowly
extending only to intentional or de jure segregation is not the only or even the wisest way to
read Brown but it is the way that the courts read Brown today. See JEROME A. BARRON & C.
THOMAS DIENE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL, 236 (3d ed. 1995).
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It is partly because of decisions like Brown and the spate of civil rights
legislation it spawned that ordinary citizen attitudes have started to
change.
434
II. INADEQUATELY ACKNOWLEDGED BENEFITS OF CIVIL SOCIETY
These cautions having been noted, there are at least three
important reasons beyond those noted or emphasized by Professor
Abel to turn to civil society as an important component in regulating
group-subordinating speech.
A. There May Be No Other Alternative
First, regulation of much harmful speech is probably prohibited
by current First Amendment doctrine. The United States Supreme
Court held decades ago in Beauharnais v. Illinois,435 that group
defamation could be regulated with few exceptions. Commentators,
however, generally agree that today the Court would hold otherwise.436
Beauharnais has been implicitly overruled by decisions such as
Cantwell v. Connecticut,437 overturning the criminal conviction of a
Jehovah's Witness for inciting a breach of the peace by playing a
phonograph record in public, which attacked all organized religious
systems as instruments of Satan, in particular, the Roman Catholic
Church. In addition, the Court held in R.A. V. v. St. Paul,43 8 that St.
Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance was unconstitutionally
applied by prosecuting under its umbrella several teenagers who
burned a cross in the front yard of an African-American family. After
R.A. V., criminal prosecutions for using racist fighting words are
434. See generally KOPPELMAN, supra note 430; JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001).
435. 343 U.S. 250 (1954).
436. See GREENAWALT, supra note 430, at 60-61.
437. 310 U.S. 296 (1946).
438. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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unlikely.439  If group defamation and a wide array of racial insults
cannot result in liability, then much group-subordinating speech is
beyond the reach of the law. Similarly, more subtle forms of
subordinating speech, such as media news coverage focusing on
Blacks as dangerous or the absence of adequate black-representation
among characters on prime-time television, face an even stronger
argument of First Amendment protection. 440 Where certain speech
compels First Amendment protection, only more-speech remedies are
viable options.
Second, modem courts generally strain to interpret civil rights
laws narrowly, and this is equally likely to be true of newer civil rights
legislation aimed at speech:
The post-civil rights era is marked by the narrowing of
legal justice for racial minorities. In particular,
nonwhite racial groups are experiencing a withering of
legal justice under anti-discrimination laws. Over the
last fifteen years, court decisions interpreting and
applying civil rights laws have tended to define racial
justice in crabbed and inverted ways. Those decisions
and recent procedural reforms conceive of and
administer justice in ways that clash with the ideals,
perceptions, and concrete experiences of many
members of racial communities, thereby dissociating
law (not completely, but significantly) from racial
justice.442
Numerous explanations have been offered for this
retrenchment. Richard Delgado attributes the problem to the law's
"homeostatic" function.44 3 Law is naturally conservative; it relies on
precedent and background assumptions, and seeks interpretations
439. See, e.g., FARBER, supra note 398, at 112 (arguing that most hate speech regulation
is constitutionally problematic after R.A. V.).
440. See Lively, supra note 404, at 885 (discussing cultural racial stereotypes on
television).
441. See YAMAMOTO, supra note 18, at 139.
442. Id. at 139.
443. See RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES 48 (1995).
20011
[VOL. 1:305
consistent with those assumptions. Legal change is, thus, generally
incremental. It is just enough reform to look good to large segments of
the public, to preserve the system from collapse, and to make everyone
feel proud, but not enough reform to wreak radical change. Because of
that, the nature of legal training is likely to perpetuate historically
dominant cultural tales that have previously penetrated the law and are
a brake on rapid change in the master narratives.44
Another explanation offered has been the increasingly
conservative tilt of the current Supreme Court toward a color blindness
that fails to differentiate "between a policy that is designed to
perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial
subordination. 4
45
Professor Yamamoto, while embracing both these
explanations, offers four additional reasons. First, the Supreme Court
views race as skin color rather than culture.446 The result, in the words
of Angela Harris, is that anti-discrimination law permits
"discrimination against traditionally subordinated groups, so long as it
is recharacterized as being based on 'culture' rather than race. 447
Second, anti-discrimination law fails to recognize the nature of the
justice grievances among communities of color.448 Third, new more
"efficient" procedural reforms, increasing sanctions for unreasonable
filings and encouraging alternative dispute resolution, lessen court
access "for those already at society's margins, especially racial and
other minorities asserting novel claims or theories that challenge
existing social and political arrangements.,' 449 Fourth, civil rights law,
as law more generally, often seeks to compare incommensurables, thus
reducing the harm from group subordination to monetary damages as
if that harm were no different from whiplash. But money damages
444. See id; GIRARDEAU SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT (1993) (articulating a similar
point concerning the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions about race); Lisa C. Ikemoto,
Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African-American/Korean American Conflict:
How We Constructed Los Angeles, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1581 (1993) (using a similar approach
as a partial explanation for white supremacy).
445. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (source of quote);
YAMAMOTO, supra note 18, at 141.
446. See YAMAMOTO, supra note 18, at 139.
447. ANGELA P. HARRIS, WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT RACE
(forthcoming 2002).
448. See YAMAMOTO, supra note 18, at 139-40.
449. Id. at 240.
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alone often "may not redress human indignity, alter relationships or
restructure offending institutions. 45 °
Whatever the explanation, if civil rights laws have their limits,
then subordinated groups must take matters into their own hands too.
Debate in civil society is one way to go about this task and is an
excellent adjunct to the law.
B. The Dignity And Power Of Protest
Critics of speech regulation sometimes argue that it
discourages minorities from talking back to the aggressor. "Nat
Hentoff, for example, writes that anti-racism rules teach black people
to depend on whites for protection, while talking back clears the air,
emphasizes self-reliance, and strengthens one's self-image as an active
agent in charge of one's destiny." The paternalism of these critics
ignores the point that talking back and legal regulation are not
inconsistent. Both strategies can and should be pursued
simultaneously. Thus, I argued that legal regulation may be necessary
sometimes to make talking back possible.
But the critics are right to argue that talking back has important
psychological and sociological benefits. Professor Abel points out that
even legal regulatory regrnes fail if no one speaks up to report a452
violation or file a claim. But there are two other benefits not yet
clearly delineated in this symposium.
First, part of what permits group-insulting stereotypes to
prosper is that the authentic voices of the disempowered are not
routinely heard in public discourse. If you never meet, hear, or see on
television an educated black male, there is no direct evidence to
counter stereotypical views of African-American men as ignoramuses.
450. Id. at 240. Yamamoto's point does not undermine my argument that compensation
furthers personal retribution. Rather, his point rightly emphasizes that monetary compensation
alone may not be sufficient to remedy the wrongs done or to change standard practice in the
future.
451. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAzis?, supra note 106, at 103 (so
characterizing Hentoff's views); NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME-BUT NOT FOR THEE:
How THE AMERICAN LEFT AND RIGHT RELENTLESSLY CENSOR EACH OTHER 100-02, 111, 159,
167 (1992).
452. See Abel, supra note 1, at 217.
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If you never encounter images of strong women, you buy into ideas of
women as weak. If you never see a generous, working class Jew, you
accept images of Jews as wealthy, penny-pinching manipulators.453
Not hearing the voices of the disempowered sends the message that
they are unworthy or incapable of speaking. In Professor David
Richards' words,
[Structural injustice's] invisibility has been constructed
by the massive suppression of the voices and views of
the persons afflicted by such injustice, thus making
culturally possible the credibility of cultural stereotypes
that dehumanize them. The denaturalization of such
profound injustice requires the voice of W. E. B.
DuBois (against American racism) or a Franz Boas
(against European anti-Semitism and American racism)
or a Betty Friedan (against American sexism) or a Walt
Whitman (against homophobia). Such voices ...
challenged ... the stereotypes that have afflicted [these
groups] ... and broke the silence in a voice empowered
by the sense of oneself as a moral person, claiming
one's basic human rights as a creative moral agent.454
Second, each person has a right to forge his own sense of
unique identity, rooted partly in the salient groups to which he
belongs.455 Respect is demanded by each of us for the differences that
define US. 4 5 6 Speaking proudly about what is different about us and
insisting on the value of that difference helps to re-affirm and re-create
our social and personal identity.457 The invention of the self in
protesting against silencing and dehumanization thus serves a deep-
seated moral need and reminds the rest of us "of the deepest principles
453. See DAVID RICHARDS, FREE SPEECH AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 240-48 (1999);
accord CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 51-88 (2001) (stating internet encourages extremism
by allowing us to tune in only on views with which we already agree).
454. See RICHARDS, supra note 453, at 240-41.
455. See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 23, at 746-58.
456. See id. at 746-58.
457. See RICHARDS, supra note 453, at 244-46.
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and values of respect for universal human rights of our constitutional
traditions. 458
C. Institutionalizing and Expanding the Anti-Subordination
Messages of the Law
The anti-rape movement that began in the 1970s serves as a
model for my final point: private organizations can be formed to
extend into civil society positive speech changes instigated by the
law.459
Among the accomplishments of the anti-rape movement were
the adoption of rape shield laws and the end of corroboration
requirements.460 Rape shield laws initially prohibited inquiry in most
cases into a victim's past sexual conduct or alleged sluttish reputation,
preventing such conduct or reputation from being allowed to prove
either that the victim must therefore have consented to sex in the
current case, or that sluts are liars.461 These statutes limited speech-
458. Id. at 246. I agree with Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic that "talking back" to
racial insults or other racist remarks is sometimes dangerous and rarely educative for the
insulter himself. See DELGADO & STAFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?, supra note 106, at
103-04. Those are arguments for legal regulation. But that does not alter the fact that
protest, where possible, can be ennobling. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM
OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) (even when civil rights struggles are
likely to fail, the struggle itself can be uplifting). Furthermore, there is a broader audience,
and if protest reaches that broader audience, well-meaning if initially ill-informed whites
may sometimes be moved to change their views and perhaps even their actions. The bottom
line point is that both legal regulation and civil society may have respective roles to play in
responding to group-subordinating speech.
459. See generally NANCY A. MATTHEWS, CONFRONTING RAPE: THE FEMINIST ANTI-RAPE
MOVEMENT AND THE STATE (1994); PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, A WOMAN SCORNED:
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE ON TRIAL (1996); CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM:
A GRASS ROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT (1992). I am not suggesting that the history of
this movement demonstrates that its efforts came anywhere near to bringing justice to rape
trials. To the contrary, I have argued elsewhere that rape law reforms and their accompanying
movements have at best had a modest effect in improving the operation of rape trials. See
TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 26, at 6-11. Nevertheless, my suggestion here is that
even less progress would have been likely absent the institutionalization of the rape reform
movement. Moreover, my analysis of the movement's limitations is that it spawned a series of
evidentiary reforms that left the courtroom speech of accused rapists substantially unregulated
while effectively silencing the courtroom speech of rape victims. See generally TASLITZ,
RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 26. I have suggested reforms to equalize the allocation of
storytelling resources among rape defendants and victims. See id.
460. See id. at 153-54.
461. See See SPoHN & HORNEY, supra note 459, at 25-29.
[VOL. 1:305
barring the voices of prior sexual conduct witnesses-to countermand
stereotypical messages about how "good women" behave and about
what sorts of women can be raped. More recent shield laws go
further. Current Federal Rule of Evidence 412 prohibits, subject to a
few narrowly defined exceptions, not only evidence of prior sexual
behavior but also of the victim's "sexual predisposition. 4 63  The
Advisory Committee Note makes clear that this language bars
evidence of the victim's sexual dreams or thoughts, mode of dress,
speech, or lifestyle. 464 The Note explains that "[a]dmission of such
evidence would contravene Rule 412's objectives of shielding the
victim from potential embarrassment and safeguarding the victim
against stereotypical thinking."465  Eliminating rules requiring
corroborating witnesses in rape but not other cases, and of instructions
cautioning jurors to be leery of rape allegations, also served to sever
466the courts from complicity in endorsing stereotypical messages.
In cities throughout the nation, organizations such as
Philadelphia's Women Organized Against Rape, "WOAR," sprung up
to institutionalize the law's new war against sexist messages playing a
role in rape cases. WOAR representatives attended trials and
monitored judges to expose behavior inconsistent with the new
paradigm. Their presence also sent a message of sisterly solidarity to
the victims at these trials.
467
WOAR assigned counselors to provide advice and moral
support to victims throughout the court process. WOAR insisted on,
and received, support from prosecutors' offices, working closely with
newly formed specialized rape units. WOAR maintained a constant
presence in these offices, monitoring prosecutors as well for evidence
of stereotyped decisionmaking or disrespectful treatment of women.
WOAR encouraged Take Back The Night marches, sexual assault
462. See TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 26, at 63, 137-4 1; STEVEN FRIDLAND,
ET. AL., EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 96-103 (2000).
463. See FED. R. EVID. 412.
464. See Advisory Committee note, FED. R. EVID. 412.
465. See id. (emphasis added).
466. See id.
467. My summary of WOAR's efforts in this section is drawn from my own experience
working with them as a prosecutor in Philadelphia. For more general information on the
activities of WOAR-like institutions, see sources cited supra note 459.
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speak-outs, and support groups. WOAR also published literature
about the rape culture and its contribution to sexual violence.
WOAR, in short, serves as a model for how laws stemming
from social change movements can offer the impetus and the resources
to institutionalize those movements. While institutionalized entities
lose some of the passion and radicalism of the initial movement, they
have the money, the personnel, and the staying power necessary for
the long haul. 68 These entities provide the encouragement and
protection needed for victims to assertively come forward in the way
that Professor Abel recommends.469 And these entities strengthen the
linkages between law and civil society so that each can be more
effective in pursuing its respective ends.
4 70
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Abel has wisely stressed the virtues of civil society
as a way to combat the ills of group-subordinating speech. I sought in
this article, however, to remind readers of the virtues of legal
regulation: satisfying group and societal retributive needs, reaffirming
social norms, encouraging debate in civil society, and correcting
market failures. I also sought to caution that these goals are probably
better achieved by the civil, rather than the criminal, justice system. In
addition, I emphasized some virtues of the turn to civil society either
ignored by Professor Abel or not elaborated upon by him: (1) civil
society's availability as often the only option for regulation under the
current legal regime; (2) civil society's ennobling promotion of dignity
in the sheer act of protest; (3) civil society's ability to change the
hearts and minds of well-meaning but ill-informed members of the
majority; and (4) civil society's virtue in ensuring that the law on the
books and the law in action correspond. I did not seek to justify
regulating any particular form of group-subordinating speech. That is
a contextual question not answerable in so general an article. Nor
have I addressed the question of the constitutionality of legal
468. See generally sources cited supra note 459.
469. See Abel, supra note 1, at 217.
470. Cf YOUNG, supra note 393, at 180-88 (noting the linkages between law and civil
society.).
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regulation of particular forms of harmful speech.47' My bottom line
point is instead a simple one: law and civil society must be understood
as complementary, not mutually exclusive, responses to the problem of
group-subordinating speech.
471. For a fascinating and persuasive recent book-length effort to address the
constitutional questions, see ALEXANDER TSEIs, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: How HATE SPEECH
PAVES THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (forthcoming 2002).
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